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Abstract
An organizational culture of safety affects employees’ attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and
values related to safe practice as well as their behaviors and level of engagement. The
purpose of this project was to determine the influence of introducing the just culture
model through staff engagement in an interactive workshop. A convenience sample of
acute care staff were recruited for this 1-sample pretest and posttest project design. The
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
instrument was used to measure safety culture perceptions on 7 dimensions pre and post
intervention. For the theoretical framework, Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior and
Kantar’s empowerment theory were used. Welch’s t test results showed significant
improvement in perception scores overall (t = 2.7, p < 0.01), with posttest mean scores (µ
= 3.7) higher than pretest mean scores (µ = 3.5). The dimension-specific mean posttest
scores were significantly higher on 3 of the 7 dimensions including teamwork (t = 2.99, p
< 0.05), feedback and communication (t = 2.14, p < 0.05), and frequency of event
reporting (t = 2.31, p < 0.05). Major implications for social change include reduction of
preventable errors and iatrogenic events; creating a healthcare environment that is safe,
fair, transparent, and reliable; creating organizational learning through evidence-based
patient safety training; and promoting the use of perception surveys to measure and
improve the culture in one’s organization. The project may provide a road map for just
culture implementation. Future qualitative and quantitative research should explore
effects of a just culture on safety reporting patterns and specific events such reducing
medication errors or risk-taking behaviors.
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Section 1: Overview of the Evidence-Based Project
Background
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err Is Human: Building a Safer
Health System (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000), which included studies that
indicated inadequacies of patient safety culture measures in healthcare organizations. The
publication detailed how a culture of safety can reduce preventable medical errors that
were determined to cause between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths per year in United States
(Kohn et al., 2000). Studies have shown that organizational responses to errors such as
establishing committees, changing policies, and scrutinizing individuals for adverse
events have not proven adequate without addressing the contributing human factors
(Sirota, 2005). Human factors such as fatigue, communication issues, stress, fear of
speaking up, and blame and shame play an important role in lack of error reporting and
negative patient outcomes (Anderson & Webster, 2001; Gorini, Miglioretti, & Pravettoni,
2012). An organizational safety culture that has a top-down support for error reporting
and resource allocation for system improvements promotes error and risk reduction
(Sirota, 2005). Studies have shown a correlation between an organization’s safety culture,
including safety subcultures within the organization, and risk reporting behaviors
(Sirriyeh, Lawton, Armitage, Gardner, & Ferguson, 2012). Therefore, a culture of safety
that fosters consistency, transparency, trust, and open communication is imperative for an
organization to deliver highly reliable and quality care.
A just culture model offers a unique framework where hospital leadership and
employees share the responsibilities for maintaining safe practices. The foundation of a
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culture of safety is trust, yet health care leaders often struggle with clearly articulating
and modeling such a culture of trust within their organization (Gorini et al., 2012). In a
just culture, shared responsibility is established through trust, open communication, and
transparency. Organizational commitment to a just culture involves acknowledgment that
in a high risk and complex environment, employees require highly reliable systems in
order to minimize adverse events. In a just culture environment, employees are
empowered to take responsibility and accountability for their actions, which reduces the
level of risk taking behaviors (Marx, 2001). Together, organizational commitment to high
reliability and employee accountability make up the just culture model, adapted by many
healthcare organizations to improve the safety and quality of patient care (Khatri, Brown,
& Hicks, 2009).
This section of the paper addresses current issues in developing a culture of safety
in healthcare and introduces the study, which uses the just culture model as a framework
for an urban medical center patient safety structure. The implementation of a just culture
model interactive workshop is essential for employees to gain the knowledge and tools
necessary to apply the just culture model for patient safety into everyday practice.
Implementation of the model will require changes in the organization’s commitment to
foster trust and employees’ perceptions and behaviors toward embracing the core
concepts. This section presents the evidence that supports the need for implementing the
project, the purpose and goals of the project, the implications of the project for social
change, and definitions of related terms.
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Problem Statement
A culture of safety focused on individual blame has devastating consequences in a
complex healthcare system where errors are known to occur. The IOM report To Err Is
Human emphasized that an organization’s culture of safety greatly impacts employee
behavior in reporting incidents or near misses and taking accountability for behavioral
choices (Kohn et al., 2000). An organizational blame or punitive based culture creates
feelings of fear and shame and often results in medical error underreporting (Gorini et al.,
2012; Kharti et al., 2009). The IOM report also provided evidence that a punitive culture,
practiced in many healthcare organizations, discourages error reporting, making it
challenging for organizational leaders to correct systems and mitigate risks (Kohn et al.,
2000). Therefore, the error reporting pattern may be an indicator of whether or not the
organization’s safety culture promotes open communication and transparency.
The IOM report regarding the lack of adverse event reporting practices is
supported by research that showed that between 50% and 96% of adverse events and near
miss events are underreported each year (Sarvadikar, Prescott, & Williams, 2010).
Studies have shown healthcare professionals who encounter errors on a daily basis report
significantly lower numbers of those errors and express fear as the major barrier to
reporting (Legg, Dempsey, & Aaron, 2013; Stavrianopoulos, 2012). Incidents or errors
that were reported also tended to be major events and errors that could not be concealed
or externally required to be reported (Morris, 2011). Major or serious adverse events that
were required to be reported to the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and the Joint
Commission (TJC) did not provide enough data for analysis, trending, and prioritization
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of high risk issues (Sorraet al., 2008). Lucian Leape, a leader in patient safety, stated that
organizational awareness of risks from near miss and adverse event data is hindered when
employees are blamed for their mistakes (Marx, 2001; Rideout, 2013). Studies support
Leape’s statement, showing that fear of being blamed was present and equally apparent
irrespective of individuals’ position and rank in the organization. Fear of blame held
greater power in deterring staff from reporting events than the fear of being punished
(Gorini et al., 2012). Overall, a punitive culture led to perceptions of shame and fear and
underreporting of near misses and adverse events, impeding the organization from
implementing prevention measures to mitigate further errors (Morris, 2011).
It is imperative for an organization to assess employees’ perceptions of safety
culture continually in order to identify barriers to employee participation in patient safety
activities and provide targeted interventions. Employee perception of safety culture
should be measured every 1 to 3 years, as culture change takes time, especially when
unacceptable behaviors have become the norm (Sheard, 2014). A study measuring
perception of safety culture showed that 40% of surveyed respondents believed that error
reports would become part of their personnel file, 33% perceived that errors would be
held against them, and 22% felt that employees were treated unfairly for mistakes (Sorra
et al., 2008). In another study, patient safety scores were found to be strong predictors of
error reporting behaviors (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013). There are key categories in safety
culture survey assessments that allow organizational leaders to gauge employee
willingness to report errors and prevent risk behaviors. The key categories are overall
patient safety, nonpunitive response to error, communication openness and shame,

5
teamwork, feedback about errors, and senior management actions in promoting patient
safety (AHRQ, 2004). El-Jardali, Dimassi, Jamal, Jaafar, and Hemadeh (2011) stated that
a culture of safety implementation must have a top-down approach and culture changes
are not sustainable without senior leadership engagement. Positive perception of safety
culture needs to be equally visible among senior leaders, managers, and front line
employees in order to maintain an environment of trust and shared accountability for safe
practices (Mantynen et al., 2014).
In the IOM publication To Err Is Human, a challenge was put forth to senior
leaders to conduct a hard analysis of their safety culture and change their paradigm on
error management and prevention (Bogner, 2009). The follow up publications from the
IOM, including Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses,
provided recommendations to promote the delivery of safe patient care (IOM, 2010).
Studies have been published that support IOM’s recommendation of a systems approach
to error management to ensure prevention of future errors along with less focus on
individual punishment, which may impede organizational learning and improvement
(Sorra et al., 2008). In addition to the IOM studies, mandatory requirements have been
established by TJC, acknowledging the need for restructuring the safety culture within
organizations through implementation of programs and systems specifically focused on
enhancing and measuring patient safety climate and culture (The Joint Commission,
2009).
Despite IOM’s published recommendations and the requirements from TJC,
healthcare facilities continue to struggle to establish a culture of safety that provides an
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environment that is just and fair (Kohn et al., 2000). Although it is indicated in current
literature that a safety culture should be just, fair, and built on the principles of high
reliability and accountability, research showing outcomes of such culture is limited. As
multiple organizations are moving toward a just culture model, scientific research on
evidence-based models for its implementation and education is essential. The gaps
identified in current research related to just culture support the importance of this project
in which a validated safety perception tool was used to measure the impact of the
introduction of the just culture model on employee safety perception scores.
Purpose Statement and Study Objectives
The purpose of this project was to explore the influence of a staff engagement in
just culture model interactive workshop on their safety culture perception. The safety
culture perception dimensions included in this study were overall perception of safety,
nonpunitive response to error, teamwork, communication openness, feedback and
communication, hospital management support for patient safety, and frequency of event
reporting, measured pre and postintervention. The members of the medical center senior
leadership were in support of this project.
The senior leadership of the medical center, as part of the strategic plan,
established a goal to implement and promote just culture principles to create an
environment where employees feel safe to report safety concerns or issues (C. Lopez,
personal communication, September 9, 2013). This project was conducted after the
strategic plan was published, providing the necessary medical center director support for
this culture change. Research showed that collecting information on perceptions of
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patient safety culture is a best practice for leadership to understand the safety culture that
is practiced on a daily basis and ensures that highly reliable systems are in place (Durbin,
Hansen, Sinkowiz-Cochran, & Cardo, 2006 ; Legg et al., 2013). Research has also
indicated that culture perception scores may indicate employees’ level of engagement in
expected safety practices such as error reporting, effective communication and teamwork,
prevention of risk behaviors, and adapting to technology and systems that improve safe
practices (McGuire et al., 2013; Sine & Nothcutt, 2008). Therefore, it is imperative to
establish an ongoing system for safety culture assessment for continual organizational
learning and improvement.
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) developed the safety
culture perception questionnaire used in this project, which addresses the just culture
factors mentioned above. I developed a just culture workshop that was provided to staff
as part of this project. The interactive just culture workshop was designed as a
comprehensive and interactive learning session emphasizing senior leadership support,
key concepts of just culture, principles of errors and human behaviors in healthcare, and
essential tools for practicing just culture. The interactive workshop was designed to help
introduce new concepts to employees during the initial stages of the culture change
journey. The project measured employees’ perceptions of safety culture before the
workshop intervention and 2 weeks after the intervention. The 2 week gap between
implementation and measurement was intended to allow participants time to evaluate
how the just culture model applied within their work area, as this activity was encouraged
during the just culture interactive workshop. It was critical to the project that the
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participants could relate the information provided in the just culture model interactive
workshop to the environment in which they currently work. The outcomes of the study
were useful in the evaluation of the interactive workshop for future use as a training tool
for the organization.
The study had three main objectives: (a) to explore acute care unit clinical staff
perceptions of patient safety culture at an urban medical center, pre just culture workshop
intervention (Time 1) and 2 weeks postintervention (Time 2); (b) to compare the
difference in the total perception scores between time 1 and time 2; and (c) to explore
differences in scores for each of the selected dimensions for the study—nonpunitive
response to error, teamwork, communication openness, feedback and communication,
hospital management support for patient safety, and frequency of event reporting—
between time 1 and , 2.
Major organizations such as the IOM, the AHRQ, and TJC have encouraged a
culture of safety driven by transparency, openness, and accountability from all employees
and organizational leaders. The just culture model provides a framework for a culture that
is driven by transparency, openness, and accountability. Implementing culture change in
an organization may present many challenges, but it is not impossible.
Project Questions
Based on the literature review, it was expected that the project would result in a
positive change in employee patient safety perception scores from the post Just culture
model interactive workshop intervention as compared to the preintervention results. A
just culture safety environment is believed to increase positive perception of
psychological safety and safety culture, which empowers staff to practice safe behaviors
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and increase risk awareness of their surroundings (Marx, 2001). The project addressed
these questions:
1. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference in
the overall perception of safety after participation in a just culture model
interactive workshop?
2. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference on
the safety dimension of nonpunitive response to error after participation in a
just culture model interactive workshop?
3. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference on
the safety dimension of teamwork after participation in a just culture
interactive workshop?
4. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference in
the safety dimension of communication openness after participation in a just
culture model interactive workshop?
5. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference in
the safety dimension of feedback and communication about errors after
participation in a just culture model interactive workshop?
6. Will patient safety culture perception scores show a significant difference in
the safety dimension of hospital management support for patient safety after
participation in a just culture model interactive workshop?
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7. Will patient safety culture scores show a significant difference in staff’s
perceptions in the safety dimension of frequency of event reporting after
participation in a just culture model interactive workshop?
8. Will patient safety culture total scores across the dimensions show significant
increase after participation in a just culture model interactive workshop?
The hypotheses were as follows:


Ha1: There is a significant increase in the perception toward overall patient
safety culture.



Ha2: There is a significant increase in the perception toward nonpunitive
response to error.



Ha3: There is a significant increase in the perception toward teamwork.



Ha4: There is a significant decrease in negative perception toward
communication openness.



Ha5: There is a significant increase in the perception toward feedback and
communication about errors.



Ha6: There is a significant increase in the perception toward hospital
management support for patient safety.



Ha7: There is a significant increase in the perception of frequency of error
reporting.



Ha0: There is no difference in perceptions of safety in all tested dimensions
above pre and post participation in a just culture interactive workshop.
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Evidence-Based Significance and Relevance to Practice
The literature review revealed that there has been minimal research conducted on
outcomes of implementation of the Just culture model as a patient safety framework,
including the relationship of model implementation with employee perception of safety
culture. The study is significant to nursing because the findings will contribute to
understanding the impact on nursing practice of implementing a just culture model. The
IOM (2010) recognized the nursing profession as being the largest workforce in
healthcare whose members can make a significant impact as leaders of change to prevent
harm associated with healthcare errors. Acute care nurses at the bedside have the ability
to determine whether a negative outcome has occurred, and to detect and report events
prior to harm reaching the patient (Despins, Scott-Cawiezell, & Rouder, 2010). One of
the major influences on a nurse’s ability to detect and respond to unexpected events is a
strong patient safety culture.
Reluctance to report adverse events stems from an organizational culture that does
not promote adverse event recognition and reporting. The literature suggested that among
healthcare providers, nurses feel more guilt and embarrassment about reporting an error
(Sarvadikar et al., 2010). A study showed that nurses experienced on average 19.5
medication errors in a 3-month period but only reported to their leadership 1.3 errors
(Joolaee, Hajibabaee, Peyrovi, Haghani, & Bahrani, 2011). A study done by Espin et al.
(2007) showed that staff only reported about 26% of errors they identified. Nurses also
voiced hesitance to report errors made by persons working in other health care
disciplines. These studies indicate that although nurses were aware of errors in the work
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environment, they may not have felt empowered and supported to report to their
leadership. The just culture model provides an environment where error reporting is
positively acknowledged and promoted.
A culture that balances accountability takes a nonpunitive approach to human
error, encourages continuous improvement, and fosters error recovery and organizational
learning (Marx, 2001). Nurses need to feel supported and empowered in their practice
environments, as studies have shown a positive correlation between positive safety
culture perception and team performance (Bradley, Postlethwaite, Koltz, Hamdani, &
Brown, 2012). Teamwork is essential for nurses to engage in error and risk prevention.
Although limited, nurses’ role in error recovery is beginning to emerge in the scientific
literature. Error detection theory indicates that harm occurs when nurses are not able to
detect warning signals in a timely manner (Despins et al., 2010).
Error prevention requires a nurse’s ability to detect errors early, intervene
promptly, and feel empowered to speak up in front of other team members. Organizations
need to develop effective training modalities that address the cognitive complexities and
decision-making skills necessary for execution of timely interventions when risks are
identified to prevent patient harm (Henneman, Marquard, & Fisher, 2012). The just
culture model, according to Marx (2001), emphasizes the importance of providing
adequate resources and support at the point of care in order for nurses to increase their
situational awareness or ability to detect errors before harm reaches the patient.
Magnet designation requires demonstration of continuous nursing excellence in
delivering safe and quality care. According to Tinkham (2013), a just culture

13
environment is essential for the successful implementation of the magnet model. The just
culture model provides an environment where components of the magnet model can be
sustained, such as shared governance, transformational leadership, continuous
improvement, and empowerment (Walker, Esquieres, Fowler, & Tennaro, 2013). A major
element that the just culture model and the magnet model share is structural
empowerment. Kantar’s empowerment theory indicates that having advancement and
professional growth opportunities with support from leaders creates an empowered
workforce (Yang, Liu, Huang, & Zhu, 2013). Structural empowerment provides an
environment where teamwork can flourish through encouraging employees to become
more accountable (Tinkham, 2013).
Studies have found a correlation between nursing empowerment, professional
practice environment, safety culture, and a nurse’s commitment to the organization
(Tigert & Laschinger, 2004; Yang et al., 2013). A study conducted with intensive care
nurses demonstrated the positive correlation of empowerment to having better mental
health, the ability to function as a team member, and less emotional exhaustion (Tigert &
Laschinger, 2004). A study examining the relationship between empowerment and
professional practice environment characteristics, and the relationship between
empowerment and patient safety culture found that empowerment was positively
correlated with both variables. Professional practice environment characteristics that were
strongly correlated with empowerment included use of the nursing model and physiciannurse relationships (collaboration). The patient safety characteristics that strongly
correlated with empowerment were found to be leadership support, informal power, and
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opportunities for growth (Armstrong & Laschinger, 2006). The commonalities between
these studies inform leadership of the importance of empowerment, visible leadership
support, opportunities for professional growth, and informal power to participate in
change. Just culture provides a just, fair, and safe environment for nurses to feel
empowered to improve their professional growth and involvement in the organization.
Implications for Social Change in Practice
The project’s implications for social change are vast, including creating
awareness of the benefits of just and fair safety culture among healthcare workers and
hospital leaders; providing evidence-based patient safety training; and promoting the use
of perception surveys or questionnaires as measurement tools to gauge the culture in
one’s organization. All of the activities listed above are important in order to yield
improved patient outcomes. According to IOM, high numbers of medical errors are
preventable; thus, there is a need for a national change in how patient safety is addressed
in the delivery of healthcare (Kohn et al., 2000). The project can be used as a catalyst to
increase research in the area of just culture and its relationship with improved safety
measures. Safety measures such as reduction of hospital-acquired infections (HAIs)
continue to be problematic. The Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
(ODPHP) indicate that 1 in 25 inpatients suffer from HAIs (ODPHP, 2009). A Just
culture model could enhance compliance with evidence-based practices that have shown
to reduce preventable adverse events such as HAIs. The Just culture model will promote
shared accountability between healthcare workers and hospital leaders to adhere to
policies and procedures, thereby addressing global and national issues that are leading to
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preventable patient harm. Statewide efforts related to the adaption of the just culture
model and healthcare are described below.
In recent years, there have been statewide just culture initiatives that illustrate the
important social change that can emerge from positive patient safety culture in healthcare
systems and the community as a whole. Preventable medical errors cause between 44,000
and 98,000 U. S. deaths per year; therefore, statewide initiatives such as the ones
described below are critical to provide safer care (Kohn et al., 2000). North Carolina and
Minnesota are two states that are exemplary in their approach to implementing statewide
initiatives for the adoption of a just culture Model in healthcare systems. The statewide
initiatives have demonstrated the importance and the feasibility of impacting social
change on a larger scale by building a statewide just culture of fairness, trust, and
accountability.
North Carolina has provided the path and lessons learned for other states to
implement just culture at a state level in order to influence social change related to safe
healthcare practices. The North Carolina Hospital Association created the North Carolina
Center for Hospital Quality and Patient Safety in 2004 in order to promote high-quality
hospitals, fair and just culture, evidence-based practice, and organizational learning. The
North Carolina state collaborative allows healthcare facilities to have access to national
experts in just culture implementation at a reasonable cost, to participate in ongoing
training, to have access to resources, and to hold collaborative meetings between facilities
(NCHA, 2012).
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Similar to the North Carolina initiative, in 2003, the Minnesota Hospital
Association, the Minnesota Department of Health, and the Minnesota Medical
Association established the Minnesota Alliance for Patient Safety (MAPS) to lead a
statewide initiative for the implementation of a just culture model across healthcare
facilities. MAPS partnered with several healthcare facilities in Minnesota to provide
guidance and resources in establishing a just culture. To bring about an effective patient
safety culture change, MAPS developed processes to support healthcare organizations in
their journey toward a just culture model. In the initial steps, MAPS created a process for
social awareness of the just culture model. The statewide efforts of MAPS resulted in just
culture awareness at senior leadership, management, and administrative staff levels;
provided education and training for senior leadership and clinical leaders; developed just
culture champions; and aligned organizational policies with just culture principles.
Healthcare facilities implemented a standardized algorithm for error investigation in
order to provide a fair, objective, and consistent way of responding to errors; as well as
embedding just culture principles in performance improvement efforts such as hand
hygiene (Page, 2007). Both state initiatives have provided lessons learned from their
healthcare organizations’ combined efforts for spreading and maintaining the journey
toward just culture.
In the initial stages of developing this DNP project, it was understood that in
order to attain a social change toward a just culture model at an organizational level, there
must be senior leadership buy-in and ownership. Culture change requires leadership to
establish just culture awareness, guidelines, policies, and systems conducive to sustaining
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a just culture model as part of daily work practices (Marx, 2001). In preparation for this
project, I provided 20-minute presentations at each of the key medical center committees,
physician meetings, and nurse manager meetings on just culture objectives and concepts
to gain ownership and buy-in for this important culture change. This project was
supported by the medical center director and other senior leadership. According to the
quality and performance director, just culture implementation is one of the organization’s
strategic plan initiatives, is part of the performance measures for the medical center
service chiefs/directors, and is intended to increase the ownership of implementation at
the service level (C. Lopez, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Leadership
buy-in demonstrated organizational readiness to introduce the just culture model to
employees where the culture needs to be embedded to yield meaningful outcomes.
In order to produce sustained social change related to a patient safety culture,
interventions should focus at the microsystem level of the organization, where care
delivery occurs (Sammer & James, 2011). Employees working at the bedside and
delivering patient care need to be supported and empowered to adapt the just culture
model. Empowerment has been shown to be positively correlated with increased job
satisfaction and less turnover, where safety issues are more likely to be reported and
mitigated (Bashaw & Lounsbury, 2012). The social change implications of just culture
are considerable for healthcare providers and the patients they serve. A just culture
environment supports the professional development of nurses by creating a framework
for collaboration and shared decision making (Bashaw & Lounsbury, 2012). An
environment of empowerment, accountability, commitment, and trust leads to safe and
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quality care (Mayer & Cronin, 2008). A cultural change of this magnitude at the
microsystem level where care is delivered can lead to major reduction in preventable
errors (Kohn et al., 2000).
Definitions of Terms
There are several key terms and concepts to understand when studying just
culture. The following operational definitions will be used in this project:
Adverse event: Incident or injury associated with health care or services provided
(Tran & Johnson, 2010). This term is interchangeable with the term incident. These
events may or may not have resulted in patient harm.
At-risk behavior: Practice drift toward unsafe habits such as circumventing
policies and processes, and inappropriately justifying risks associated with rule breaking
(Marx, 2001).
Blame culture or punitive culture: Defined as the set of organizational norms and
attitudes that discourages speaking up when an adverse event is recognized due to fear of
punitive actions (Gorini et al., 2012).
Close calls or near misses: Events that could have resulted in patient accident,
injury, or illness that was prevented by chance or nursing interventions (NCPS, n.d.).
Communication: The effective exchange of critical information among
interdisciplinary teams, healthcare staff, and leadership (Polito, 2013).
Culture: The integrated pattern of symbols, rituals, values, and beliefs that are
unique to a particular group, system, or organization (Kaufman & McCaughan, 2013).
Evidence-based care: Care based on scientific evidence and clinical expertise that
is patient centered, resulting in positive patient outcomes (Wenstock, 2013).

19
Environment: Includes the factors, objects, or conditions that are present within
the surroundings of patient care delivery such as visual and auditory stimulation,
temperature, and objects or equipment (Frankel, Leonard, Simmonds, Haradan, & Vega,
2009).
Error: Failing to complete an action as intended or using a wrong plan
(commission) and/or failure to carry out an intended action (omission), which could
result in unintended negative outcomes (Frankel et al., 2009; NSPS, n.d.).
Harm: Temporary or permanent damage that results from physical or
psychological injury of a person (NCPS, n.d.).
Human error: Unintended action or an omission of an action that caused an
adverse outcome. “When there is general agreement that the individual should have done
other than what they did, and in the course of that conduct inadvertently causes or could
cause an undesirable outcome, the individual is labeled as having committed an error”
(Marx, 2001, p. 6).
Human factors: The relationships that need to be considered in designing
processes to ensure optimal interface between the process or tools and humans using the
processes and tools. An example of a strong human factors engineering process is the use
of forced functions not allowing individuals to skip steps in processes (Frankel et al.,
2009).
Just culture model: Provides an environment of psychological safety where staff
members feel empowered to speak up during risky situations to prevent harm and where
near miss and error reporting behaviors are incentivized and not punished (LaSala &
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Bjarnason, 2010). When there is a just culture, staff understand the need to take
accountability for their own behavioral choices and that reckless behaviors may result in
punishment. In a just culture, an organization strives to learn from mistakes and takes
responsibility to build systems and processes designed to prevent adverse events (Marx,
2001).
Leadership: An individual influence on the behaviors and actions of others that
produces the desire of others to follow with or without the use of authority (Ellis &
Abbot, 2013).
Near miss: A potentially adverse event that was intercepted and prevented in a
timely manner prior to producing patient harm (NCPS, n.d.).
Organizational culture: A “complex mixture of different elements that influence
the way things are done as well as the way things are understood, judged and valued”
(Kaufman & McCaughan, 2013, p. 52).
Patient outcome: The measure of health and well-being of patients associated
with medical care. Patient-centered care is the provision of individualized and holistic
care congruent with patients’ needs and values and with shared decision making among
patients and healthcare professionals.
Patient safety: Being free from harm or risk (NCPS, n.d.).
Patient safety culture: An environment that includes shared values, beliefs,
norms, and priorities related to safe practices among an organization’s leadership and
employees (Stavrianopoulos, 2012).
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Preventable events: Events that are due to errors or system failures leading to
previously unnecessary or unplanned services and negative patient outcomes. These
events are preventable when they could have been mitigated prior to causing error
(Goldfield, Kelly, & Patel, 2012).
Psychological safety: A perception one has regarding interpersonal risk taking
within a defined work group. Risk taking includes reporting an event, acknowledging a
mistake, or seeking feedback. When there is a perception of psychological safety, staff
members feel confident that they will not feel embarrassment, rejection, or punishment
for speaking up. There is open communication, constructive disagreements, increased
contribution, and sharing of critical issues affecting patients (Bradley et al., 2012).
Quality of care: Providing evidence-based care that is patient centered and
delivered safely.
Reckless behavior: The third behavior that occurs when an employee purposefully
disregards the rules and processes, knowing the risks are substantial (Marx, 2001).
Sentinel events: Unexpected events leading to significant physical or
psychological injury, loss of limb(s) or function, and/or death to staff, visitors, and
vendors occurring within the healthcare facility (TJC, 2012).
System failures: Failures that occur due to system design, human factor
engineering failures, and/or organizational failures (NCPS, n.d.).
Assumptions of the Project
For this project, it was assumed that participants were willing and engaged in the
intervention process and, additionally, that the participants were willing to provide honest
and accurate responses to the pretest and posttest questionnaires administered. It was
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assumed that employees had basic patient safety knowledge regarding error reporting.
The assumptions also included management support for employee participation and
application of information learned during the interventional workshop in their work areas.
Limitations of the Study
The design of this quasi-experimental one group pretest/posttest project posed
limitations including the use of a convenience sample and lack of randomization. The
generalizability is limited because the targeted group for the study was staff members
working on the acute care units within the urban medical center. The small sample size
(33 participants, a 27% participation rate) for the pretest was anticipated due to potential
unwillingness of nurses to participate in the project due to fear of disclosure of their own
safety culture views, including perceptions regarding managers and other team members
(Burns & Grove, 2009).
Summary
A positive culture of safety can reduce preventable medical errors. An
organizational culture that supports individual blame creates feelings of fear and shame
and often results in an increased number of medical errors and underreporting of errors.
Therefore, an organization must establish a safety culture that has top-down support for
error reporting and resource allocation for system improvements that promote error and
risk reduction. Despite IOM’s published recommendations and requirements from the
TJC, healthcare facilities continue to struggle to establish a culture of safety that provides
an environment of just culture to support employee empowerment and accountability in
order to increase safety and reporting behaviors. The gaps identified in current research,
lack of just culture model implementation and outcome studies supported the importance
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of this project. The purpose of this project was to explore the influence of a just culture
model interactive workshop on employee safety culture perceptions measured pre and
postintervention. Limitations were explored including recruitment of a convenience
sample, having no control group, and a small sample size. The implications for nursing
practice are significant, as the nursing profession is the largest work force in healthcare
whose members can act as leaders of change to prevent harm associated with healthcare.
North Carolina and Minnesota are two states that have demonstrated an impact on social
change on a larger scale for just culture model implementation in healthcare facilities
statewide. The following section further explores the existing literature on patient safety
models, focusing on the Just culture model and the theoretical framework that will be
used in implementing a Just culture model in the project organization.
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Section 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Adverse events occur in healthcare due to the complexity of care, environmental
factors, communication failures, and failure in interactions of humans with technology
(Henneman et al., 2012). Within healthcare, it is essential to have clear definitions and
expectations regarding organizational values and safety culture. Executing leadership
functions with vague or unclear policies and structure leads to staff frustration,
disengagement, and poor behavioral choices. The literature review for this project begins
with a clear definition of patient safety culture. With a clear definition, exploration can
begin into the core concepts and characteristics of patient safety culture that drive
organizational practices. The purpose of this project was to explore the influence of a Just
culture model interactive workshop on employee safety culture perceptions. In this
section, existing literature is explored to clarify the impact of Just culture core concepts
on error reduction. It is imperative to understand current research pertaining to patient
safety culture and to evaluate the evidence before implementing a culture change to
improve safety practices. Literature is explored to identify effective patient safety culture,
recommendations for Just culture model implementation, and the impact of safety culture
on the work environment, errors, incident reporting patterns, and employee behaviors.
The theoretical model used to deliver the Just culture model education intervention is
explained.
An extensive literature search was conducted using the Cumulative Index of
Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), MEDLINE, and PUBMED databases
through the Walden University library. Research articles were limited to peer-reviewed
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articles published between 2005 and summer 2014. Research articles and systematic
reviews related to safety culture were identified using combinations of various key words
including patient safety, error recognition, nurse role, patient safety, just culture,
organizational culture, just culture algorithm, and adverse events. In addition, the
National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS), World Health Organization (WHO) AHRQ,
IOM, and TJC websites were searched to gain information regarding current trends,
measurement tools, and research opportunities related to patient safety culture.
General Literature
Patient safety culture is driven by individual and shared values, beliefs, norms,
and priorities as they relate to safe practices among organizations’ leadership and
employees (Stavrianopoulos, 2012). National institutions such as the IOM, TJC, NCPS,
and AHRQ have been instrumental in shaping and improving patient safety culture across
U. S. hospitals. It is known that healthcare organizations lack systems that allow for
identifying and addressing weaknesses prospectively to prevent further adverse events,
which claim an estimated 98,000 lives each year in the United States (Kohn et al., 2000).
Similarly, reports published prior to the publication of the IOM study in 1999 supported
the phenomenon of patients experiencing high rates of iatrogenic injuries (Liang, 1999).
Healthcare organizations have learned about patient safety from other industries,
especially aviation. In the 1980s, large-scale disasters in industries such as railway and
nuclear power plants started an initiative to create principles for safe cultures. There was
minimal research related to patient safety or medical errors (Vincent, Stanhope, &
Crowley-Murphy, 1999); slowly, organizations began to understand that the complexity
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of an organization increased the probability of having more system failures. Accidents
were reviewed as multifactorial chains of events rather than being regarded as having a
single cause. (WHO, n.d.). According to Leape, a patient safety expert, healthcare
organizations were still attributing medical errors to increased need for training and
motivation of healthcare workers and not perceiving the causes as multifactorial. Leape
suggested that errors should be viewed from a human-systems interface point of view that
recognized the fallibility of healthcare providers and the need to support the practice
environment with reliable systems (Vincent et al., 1999). Healthcare began a shift in error
management processes, understanding the relationships between patient safety and
adverse events. The concepts to reduce variation in quality of care standards in healthcare
settings further contributed to the patient safety movement (Vincent et al., 1999). James
Reason, considered the intellectual father of the patient safety field, was a leader in
shifting the healthcare paradigm to view errors as failures in system layers and not as
individual errors (WHO, n.d.).
In the 1990s, healthcare systems began to acknowledge that errors do occur and
began to develop systems thinking in error prevention. Systems thinking theory using
information about human behaviors and capabilities for redesigning or building systems
and technology was beginning to emerge (NCPS, n.d.). However, it was the IOM
publication that sparked a national movement toward improving healthcare quality and
safety (Wears et al., 2000). The commitment to developing a safety culture has had a
significant impact on saving lives, as more people die each year from medical errors
(Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, & Lackan, 2010). Organizational commitment to safety
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reflects an acknowledgment that in high-risk and complex environments, employees
require highly reliable systems in order to minimize adverse events and foster positive
organizational safety cultures, the delivery of quality and safe care, management of
errors, and organizational learning (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013; Starvrianopoulos, 2012).
Multiple scientific research studies have shown that adverse events occur in
healthcare due to the complexity of care, environmental factors, communication failures,
and failure in interactions of humans with technology (Elliott, Page, & Warrall-Carter,
2012; Henneman et al., 2012). Cultural and nontechnical system failures such as
breakdowns in communication were cited as major contributory factors in medical errors
(Garon, 2012; Khatri et al., 2009). Factors that lead to miscommunication or no
communication include workplace disruptive behaviors, lack of interprofessional
collaboration, and lack of empowerment (Garon, 2012). Effective methods have been
identified to improve communication, teamwork, and overall safety climate perception
such as team training, hands-off communication tools, and interdisciplinary patient
rounding (Weaver et al., 2013).
In a just culture, employees are empowered and feel psychologically safe to report
adverse events and near misses (Morris, 2011). An organization committed to safety
fosters an environment of open communication, trust, continuous improvement, and
adverse event and near-miss reporting without fear of reprisal. The Just culture model
will be further discussed in the following section.
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Specific Literature
Just culture Model
In recent years, healthcare organizations have begun adopting just culture as a
critical framework for improving the safety and quality of patient care (Khatri et al.,
2009; Marx, 2001). Many healthcare organizations have yet to implement just culture as
a framework. David Marx, an expert in human error management and human factors
engineering, emphasized that just culture is not a blame-free but an accountability-rich
culture. Just culture establishes accountability from both employees and leadership. Just
culture facilitates appropriate investigation of adverse events in the context of human
behavior including human error, at-risk behavior, and reckless behavior (Marx, 2001).
To promote organizational learning, a patient safety paradigm needs to shift
toward creating opportunities to learn from errors and educating health care staff on
practice and situational awareness (Rideout, 2013; Westphal, 2009). Organizations that
have adopted just culture principles are able to manage unanticipated events successfully
by being proactive in failure identification and mitigation through analyzing the root
cause (Despins et al., 2010). In a just culture, there needs to be transparency concerning
the expectations of organizational responsibility for system failures and
employee accountability for behavior choices (Marx, 2001).
The just culture model (see Figure 1) has the following key components:


Risks should always be anticipated due to system failures, human errors,
decreased sense of risk, or practice drift



Everyone in the organization is accountable for his or her actions
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Organizational values and mission should drive patient safety



The just culture algorithm should be used to objectively and fairly investigate
near-miss or adverse events



Appropriate management of three behaviors associated with errors: human
error, at-risk behavior, and reckless behavior



Speak-Up tool should be used to communicate concerns and prevent risk



Leadership support for creating a psychologically safe environment in order to
promote staff members’ intentions to speak up, report near-miss and adverse
events, and be accountable for their own behavioral choices (Marx, 2001).

Figure 1. Just culture model core concepts. From Patient Safety and the “Just culture”. A
Primer for Health Care Executives, by D. Marx, 2001, retrieved from
http://www.safer.healthcare.ucla.edu/safer/archive/ahrq/FinalPrimerDoc.pdf
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The WHO, the American Nurses Association (ANA), and the IOM have endorsed
the concepts of just culture to prevent patient harm in the healthcare environment (ANA,
n.d., WHO, n.d.). Just culture is a framework for patient safety in which both leaders’ and
staff members’ accountability is expected and practiced (Westphal, 2009). Just culture
promotes transparency among leadership, employees, and customers or patients. In a just
culture environment, employees feel safe to disclose medical errors, allowing the
organization to learn from and prevent similar occurrences (Marx, 2001). Transparency is
possible as long as organizational leaders accept that adverse events will occur in a
complex healthcare environment and believe that open communication is the key to
creating accountability and trust (Bashaw & Lounsbury, 2012). The just culture Model
promotes transparency through the use of a Just culture algorithm for event investigation.
Transparency builds an environment of trust where employees perceive they can speak up
to prevent risks and report adverse events to ensure positive outcomes for patients (Marx,
2001).
Four main concepts of Just culture are as followed: establishing a psychologically
safe environment, use of the Just culture algorithm, speaking up to prevent risks, and
event reporting. These concepts should be referred to as a “Just culture bundle,” as they
are all essential for successful implementation of Just culture. These are further explained
in the upcoming paragraphs.
Psychological Safety
Employees’ perception of psychological safety is a driving factor in employees’
attitudes and behavioral decisions. A brief description of psychological safety and impact
on safety behaviors is provided. It is organizational leadership’s responsibility to create a
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psychologically safe environment for employees. Without a psychologically safe
environment, procedures such as hands-off communication and surgical timeouts
designed to improve communication are more likely to break down. TJC reported that the
number one cause of sentinel events such as wrong-site surgery was a lack of clear
communication (TJC, 2012). Psychological safety is threatened by perceptions of
consequences including rejection or punishment from openly expressing ideas, opposing
views, beliefs, and feedback to peers or team members (Bradley et al., 2012).
Psychological safety influences individuals’ behavioral choices (Singh, Winkel, &
Selvarajan, 2013). In one study, team psychological safety was found to be related
positively to reported errors (β = 0.28, p < 0.05; Leroy et al., 2012). A study examining
the relationship between psychological safety and conflict management in teams showed
that resolution of task conflicts such as disagreement and differences in opinion
correlated positively to high performance when teams perceived high levels of
psychological safety (β=0.25, p < 0.05; Bradley et al., 2012). Therefore, psychological
safety impacts safety culture or climate, teamwork, and openness with error reporting.
Factors that enhance psychological safety such as communication, trust, transparency,
organizational learning, and leadership commitment and support have a major influence
on positive organizational safety culture (Starvrianopoulos, 2012).
Just culture Algorithm
Embedding just culture principles into practice requires managers and employees
throughout the organization to use a standardized algorithm for event investigation and
postevent decision making. There are various algorithms published that provide
guidelines for event investigation (Marx, 2001; Meadows, Baker, & Butler, 2005;
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Peltomaa, 2012). The algorithms provide a consistent methodology to address critical
questions that lead to the cause of the issue (Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006). They
provide a framework in which human behavioral choice can be evaluated in the context
of the adverse event or near miss being investigated. The just culture algorithm allows
leaders to avoid rushing to individual judgment and punishment, instead identifying the
human behavior and the system failures associated with the error in order to prevent
future occurrences (Marx, 2001). Similarly, James Reason developed an error
investigation algorithm and the Swiss cheese model to illustrate how potential for errors
related to system issues such as lack of policies, failure to communicate, and insufficient
training can result in patient harm (Peltomaa, 2012; Perneger, 2005). Managers must
review errors for contributing human behaviors in order to address both systems issues
and potential human behavior issues (Marx, 2001). Thus, use of the algorithm can be a
catalyst for building trust between employees and management through the knowledge
that each incident will be treated using a fair and objective method (Frankel et al., 2006).
The just culture principle is based on management of three types of human
behavior: human error, at-risk behavior, and reckless behavior. Each of these behaviors
should be managed differently, as human error requires consoling, at-risk behavior
requires counseling, and reckless behavior requires punitive action (Marx, 2001). A just
culture algorithm guides managers during error investigation in identifying the type of
human behavior that contributed to the event. Analysis of errors based on these three
types of behavior balances employee accountability and organizational learning (Mayer
& Cronin, 2008). Human error addresses the notion that even highly trained healthcare
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professionals make mistakes (Wilson, Fabri, & Wolfson, 2012). Treating human error
differently than at-risk behavior and reckless behavior ensures that individuals are not
blamed for errors that were outside of their control. Anticipating that there will always be
human error in a healthcare environment is a key concept of a just culture model (Marx,
2001).
Just culture focuses on reducing at-risk behaviors and eliminating reckless
behaviors, which can cause significant errors and patient harm due to behavioral choices
such as circumventing policies and creating workarounds. At-risk behaviors become the
norm over time if leadership does not catch and fix the systems, coach the employee, and
deincentivize the at-risk behavior. Decreased perceptions of risks, attitudes toward
policies and procedures, and cultural norms cause employees to drift toward at-risk
behaviors and unhealthy habits. In a just culture model, the organization has increased
awareness of at-risk behaviors and strives toward reducing or eliminating system-wide
issues that create at-risk behaviors (Pepe & Cataldo, 2011). A just culture model
encourages zero tolerance when staff members are engaged in reckless behaviors.
Reckless behaviors occur when an employee purposefully disregards the rules and
processes, knowing the risks are substantial (Marx, 2001). In a just culture model,
employees are educated about accountability for behavioral choices and are incentivized
to avoid risk behaviors.
The just culture algorithm (see Figure 2) that was used in this project was created
based on knowledge gained from the Marx just culture model, Reasons error
investigation, human factors science, and literature on peer review, root cause analysis,
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and quality improvement processes (Marx, 2001; Meadows et al., 2005; Peltomaa, 2012).
The just culture algorithm consists of 7 investigative categories: (a) Individuals intent,
(b) Equipment failure, (c) Peer action of similar experience, (d) Training issues, (e)
Competency evaluation, (f) Individual’s risk awareness, and (g) System barriers. The
algorithm as illustrated below guides managers and employees through the 7 categories
with questions to identify a potential cause of the problem with recommendations for
follow up actions.
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Use of this algorithm requires review the event or incident,
interview with staff and evaluation of processes and appropriate
policies.

Was the
employee's
intention to cause
harm or adverse
consequences?

Was there an equipment
failure involved?

Review equipment if one
involved in the incident or
event for proper
functioning for the purpose
NOT
designed; maintenance
Review the event, SURE
program; safety
and the actions of
review/features; usability;
the employee.
alarm system for failure
detectability; user training
YES
YES
Action: Conscious
Was
the
equipment
being
disregard of risks is
used for unintended
Reckless Behavior.
purposes or modified by the
Examples are
end user, deviating from
purposefully violating
manufactures
rules; criminal act;
recommendations?
alcohol or substance
Review to determine if
equipment mis-use
occurred
NO

YES

Action: This could indicate
At-RiskBehavior or Reckless
Behavior when deviating from
intended use of equipment. Do
further review for cause of
deviation. Discuss risk taking
behavior with staff. Disciplinary
action could be consideredif
Reckless Behavior found. Refer to
HR Guidelines and Policies.

Just Culture Algorithm - Decision Tree for Review of Safety Events

Would most experienced
Should the employee
competent peers have
have known the
managed the case in a
policy/procedure/rules?
NO
NO
NO similar manner?
Evaluate the normal
practice on the unit,
investigate whether peers
with similartraining/job
would take similar actions.

Action: This could indicate
At-Risk Behaviorconsider
NO coaching, training and
competency assessment.
Review systemprocesses
Discuss with the employee
related to job specific
regarding risks taking behavior
training to identify any gaps.
that contributed to this event,
Do not consider disciplinary
and awareness of risks.
action.
YES

YES

YES

Action: This could indicate
systemissue from Human
Error or At-Risk Behaviors
taken. Do further review
for practice driftor systems
issues. Discuss with Patient
Safety, Quality or Risk to
initiate appropriate process
improvement. Do not
consider disciplinary action.

Did the employee receive
sufficient ongoing training
and competency
NO
evaluation?
Review employee's
ongoing training and
competency assessment

Action: For Human
Error due to slips/laps,
lack of training;
consider evaluating
ongoingcompetency
maintenance process;

Action: This could indicate
systemissue from Human
Error, equipment design ,
safety, functionality, or
maintenance program issues.
Consult with Bio-Med and
Patient Safety to take
appropriate follow up actions
for equipment failure. Do not
consider disciplinary action.

Action: This could indicate
Reckless Behavior if
consciously disregarding risks.
Discuss with employee risk
taking behaviors. Disciplinary
actions could be considered.
Refer to HR Guidelines and
Policies.

YES
Was it possible to followthe
procedure/rules/policy?

NO

3 Behavior Types to identify:
Human Error: slips, lapses, mistakes, system
failures
At Risk Behavior: drifting from
procedure/policies, decrease perception of risk,
unaware of risk taking behavior.
Reckless Behavior: A choice to consciously
disregard procedure/policy; taking substantial risk
regardless of outcome.

Review orientation and
training documentation
of the employee.
Discuss with employee.

Was the employee aware of
the risks that may result from
their actions taken in this
situation?

NO
Review incident for any
system barriers, environment,
equipment issues; clear
policies; policy implementation

YES
Action: This could indicate
Reckless Behavior if consciously
disregarding risks; or repeatedly
not following procedures and
policies. Consider disciplinary
actions. Referto HR Guidelines
and Policies.

Action: For Human Error
consider review of systems
issues. Discuss with Patient
Safety, Quality or Risk to
initiate appropriate process

YES

Action: This could indicate At-Risk
Behaviorif there is a drift from
practice; or employee not aware of
the risks taken. Consider coaching
and discussion about risk taking

Reference: (Marx, 2001; Meadows, Baker, & Butler, 2005; Peltomaa, 2012; Reason,1997).

Figure 2. Just culture algorithm (Marx, 2001; Meadows, Baker, & Butler, 2005;
Peltomaa, 2012, Reason, 1997).
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Adverse Event Reporting
In a just culture model, errors are analyzed objectively and in a just manner, as
human errors and at-risk behaviors do not result in punitive actions. Just culture cultivates
employee accountability for risk taking behaviors (Frankel et al., 2006; Marx, 2001). The
just culture model encourages objective error analysis to identify risks, prevent
inappropriate punitive actions, and increase error reporting. The IOM’s report regarding
the lack of incident reporting practice is supported by scientific research that showed
about 50% to 96% of adverse events are under-reported every year (Breathnach et al.,
2011; Sarvadikar et al., 2010). The organization's culture of safety greatly impacts staff’s
behavior to report incidents or near misses, accountability for choices, and involvement
in systems improvement studies. Punitive safety cultures have resulted in decreased error
detection and reporting patterns. In a recent study, significant relationships were
discovered between willingness to report and nonpunitive response to error and the
number of reported events (p<0.01) (Smits et al., 2012).
Blame or punitive culture has contributed to deeply rooted fear of punishment and
embarrassment that has prevented employees from reporting adverse events and near
misses. Employees develop norms of under-reporting through long-term exposure
to blaming and shaming employees for mistakes and labeling as professionally incapable
for carrying out assigned duties (Gorini et al., 2012). This is evidenced by research
studies that showed nurses were reporting approximately 1 out of 19 medication errors
and only 26% of identified errors (Joolaee et al., 2001; Espin et al., 2007).
In a complex healthcare organization, there are often sequences of near-miss
events that lead to an actual harmful event. Near miss events occur at a rate of 300 times
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more than actual events and are considered to be early warning signs of an inevitable
harm event if not mitigated (Cohoon, 2011; Grant & Larsen, 2007). Organizational
leaders can take action to prevent system failures when made aware of near miss events.
In one study, data showed 5 times more near miss reports than adverse event reports
during an 18-month period after employees received intensive education regarding near
miss events and importance of reporting (Frankel et al., 2006).
The literature review indicated that the current state of patient safety reporting
patterns, organizational safety culture, and infrastructure are inconsistent across
healthcare facilities. Healthcare organizations have been adopting error reporting
mechanisms based on aviation industry that established an effective Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) in which employees were encouraged to make anonymous
safety reports for systematic improvements (Liang, 1999). There is lack of research
studies that define the root cause of why barriers exist for identification and reporting of
adverse events across healthcare settings. However, many research studies indicate fear,
shame, blame, and poor access to reporting systems as causes of under-reporting, but the
deeper question remains.
In order to address under-reporting of incidents on a national scale, the federal
government provided funding to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
division for Patient Safety, AHRQ and established the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement (PSQI) Act of 2005. After much debate over creating mandatory versus
voluntary reporting structures, Congress passed the PSQI act. This voluntary,
confidential, and national reporting system was established for hospitals, physicians, and
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other healthcare providers to submit safety reports called patient safety work product
(PSWP). AHRQ created local and regional Patient Safety Organizations (PSO) to
manage, analyze, and disseminate information learned from reported adverse events.
Congress provided funding for AHRQ to establish a Network of Patient Safety
Databases (NPSD) to store adverse event data for national level aggregation and analysis.
The goal of the Act was to discover and analyze system weaknesses in delivery of care
and to mitigate adverse events. Based on the current literature review, is it unclear that
the PSQI Act alone can achieve this goal. Literature reports the barriers punitive
organizational cultures continue to place on employee reporting patterns and
organizational process improvement, even after the Act passed in 2005. There are many
studies evaluating interventions that lead to improved patient safety culture but limited
studies focus on measuring the impact of an organization’s culture on the patient safety
reporting patterns (Weaver et al., 2013).
Empowering Staff to Speak Up
Just culture is a shared accountability between organizational leaders and
employees (Marx, 2001). Empowering staff to speak up or stop the line is part of
implementing just culture. The goals of this project included increasing staff skills to
speak up and intercept errors before they reach the patient. Nontechnical skills such as
situational awareness and speaking up are important for prevention of adverse events
(Rideout, 2013). Communication failures have been cited as the main root cause of
system failures. TJC reported that 70% of sentinel event root causes were determined to
be communication failures (Polito, 2013).
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In healthcare organizations, Patient harm can occur when the team providing the
care is not able to speak up. An essential component of communication is the ability to
speak up during crucial moments that have the potential to result in negative outcomes. A
qualitative study conducted by Garon (2012) regarding speaking up behaviors of nurses
identified personal influences such as culture, education, and home environment as
common themes for shaping their attitudes towards speaking up. Most importantly, the
study identified that nurses felt they were more likely to speak up if the managers and
supervisors promoted open and positive communication (Garon, 2012). Organizational
structure and culture influenced staff behaviors in speaking up. Patient safety issues arise
when a culture is driven by blame and silence. Leaders are not able to address
organizational issues when there is a lack of open communication and transparency
(Garon, 2012).
Employees need to have effective communication skills as part of the
interdisciplinary team caring for patients. A study utilizing Clinical Resource
Management (CRM) training for enhancing team communication, which included
speaking up techniques, found a positive correlation between CRM training
implementation and improvement in teamwork and communication scores (3.7 to 4.4, p <
.05). The study used the Clinical Teamwork Scale (CTS) Likert scale measurement tool
(Paull et al. 2013). As a team member, when an immediate risk to the patient is
recognized, the team member must be empowered to speak up. The NCPS developed the
“3W” tool that assists staff in organizing their thoughts to speak up clearly and directly.
The abbreviation “3W” stands for: “What I see, What I’m concerned about, and What I
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want” (NCPS, n.d.). This “3W” tool can be helpful in teaching employees how to
communicate concerns and risks effectively.
Measuring Patient Safety Culture
Major oversight organizations such as TJC require healthcare organizations to
establish a patient safety program and have an ongoing method for measuring patient
safety perceptions of employees and utilizing the results to improve safety and quality of
care for patients (TJC, 2012). Tools such as the Patient Safety Climate in Health Care
Organizations (PSCHO), Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), and the Hospital Survey
on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC) have been developed to measure employee
perceptions of patient safety culture. All the tools use Likert scale questionnaires for
quantitative measurement and a free text comment section for qualitative measurement.
The PSCHO was built on high-reliability culture principles and has demonstrated validity
tested in 105 U.S hospitals (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 0.50 to 0.89) (Singer et al.,
2007). The SAQ originally developed for intensive care environment measures working
conditions, staffing, stress, teamwork, job satisfaction, and management; and has no
strong validation of reliability in other work units (Sexton et al., 2011).
AHRQ established a patient safety center and developed the HSPSC tool in 2004.
It is widely used by healthcare centers to measure patient safety culture perception among
employees. The HSPSC instrument is a reliable tool that measures safety culture
perception across ten safety culture dimensions and two outcome dimensions with 42
questions. The dimensions of safety culture measured by the HSPSC include: nonpunitive
response to error, communication openness, teamwork within unit, teamwork across
hospital, feedback and communication about error, staffing, organizational learning
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continuous improvement, hospital management support for patient safety,
supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety, and hospital
handoffs and transitions. Outcome measures include overall perceptions of safety and
frequency of event reporting. HSPSC was pilot tested in 21 U. S. hospitals and has
established psychometric properties. Reliability of the tool has been reported with
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging from 0.63 to 0.84 for each of the 14 safety culture
dimensions (AHRQ, 2004). Measuring the above dimensions through a validated
instrument is the key to the establishment of positive patient safety culture (IOM, 2000;
2004).
Since the IOM publication of To Err Is Human and TJC’s requirements to
establish a culture measurement process, studies on measuring perceptions of patient
safety culture have increased. Studies show the important connection of employee
perceptions of a safety culture and the safety climate of the organization (Pronovost et al.,
2003). The commonalities in the safety culture perception studies included showing
differences in perceptions among groups of professionals such as nurses and doctors,
indication of lower staff perception of management commitment to safety, lower scores
in willingness to report errors, and feedback regarding errors (Pronovost et al., 2003;
Singer et al., 2007). Some studies showed differences in perception of safety culture
among managerial and non-managerial staff, with managerial staff providing more
positive responses (Singer et al., 2007). Most studies had limited generalizability due to
the sample size and convenience sampling methodologies used. Studies about patient
safety culture perceptions have focused on a comparison of perceptions across units in
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the hospital, disciplines, and leadership hierarchal status. Studies are limited to measuring
perceptions of safety culture pre and postintervention. In this DNP project, the HSPSC
tool was used to evaluate the impact of a just culture model interactive workshop
intervention on employee perceptions of patient safety.
Theoretical Framework
Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (TPB) was used as a framework to implement
an effective just culture training program to improve safety culture successfully. The TBP
model provided an approach for evaluating and coaching staff toward embracing a
culture change based on fairness, justice, and accountability. The major factor in TBP is
the intent of the individual to perform. Intent is described as the willingness and
motivational level of the individual to carry out a specific desired behavior. Factors
influencing intent to perform include degree of actual and perceived control, attitude
toward behavior, and subjective norms. These factors were discussed during the
workshop when exploring barriers to performing patient safety activities such as speaking
up to prevent risks and reporting of near misses and errors.
Perceived Behavioral Control
Perceived behavioral control is the degree of control an individual has which is
driven by level of motivation and resources such as time, skills, empowerment, and
cooperation of other key players (Ajzen, 1991). Perceived behavioral control is more
important to focus on than actual behavioral control when evaluating intent to perform an
act or behavior. Perception of control relies on the individual’s perception of the level of
difficulty in performing the desired behavior including obstacles and barriers (Ajzen,
1991). An individual’s level of perceived behavioral control would vary depending on the
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situation or task being performed. For example, a nurse may perceive that she/he has a
higher degree of control asking a nurse peer to adhere to hand washing requirements than
asking a surgeon to perform the required a time out prior to a procedure.
In a just culture model, it is important to recognize that even though it may seem
that staff members have the knowledge and actual control to prevent risks by speaking
up, reporting, and mitigating risks (internal control), the perception of control plays a
significant role in the individual’s ability to carry out the intended behavior. (Ajzen,
2002). According to TBP, staff willingness to integrate just culture principles in their
daily practice may be predicted by the factors that drive perceived behavioral control and
behavioral intention. TBP recommended specific behavior of interest and the “specified
context must be the same as that in which the behavior is to occur” in order to use
perceived control of behavior as a predictor for actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991, p. 185). In
addition, perceived behavioral control can be used as a predictor for actual behavioral
control (Ajzen, 2002). This theory supports the efficacy of administering safety culture
perception surveys to predict staff behaviors related to error reporting, teamwork, and
open communication.
Attitude Toward Behavior
Behavioral attitude, the second component that impacts intent to perform, is the
degree in which the individual believes the intended performance adds value or is
necessary. Beliefs and values drive ones attitudes towards the desired action. Other
attributes such as risks and benefits of the action and cost and resources needed to carry
out the action will influence how the individual values the behavior either negatively or
positively. In studies, increased knowledge alone was not found to change attitudes and
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correct behaviors without the appropriate support (Ajzen, Joyce, Sheikh, & Cote, 2011).
In order to change ones behavior through engagement or training, there must be an
evaluation of current knowledge and how the employees are utilizing their current
knowledge to drive their behavioral choices (Ajzen et al., 2011). The consequences of
performing the intended action and the probability that it will result in the desired
outcome also drives staff attitudes (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, it is important for leaders to
demonstrate openness and positive outcomes related to staff engagement in patient safety
culture.
A study done by Timmins and McCabe (2005) showed that lack of assertiveness
was not the driving force behind the nurses inability to speak up effectively; rather, it was
their desire to maintain positive interpersonal relationships with their colleagues and
avoid conflict (Garon, 2012). This study indicated the attitude of nurses toward the
importance of speaking up was influenced by the perceived consequences, which was the
potential for a negative impact on relationships and conflict. Similarly, studies reporting
reasons for not reporting incidents indicated staff attitudes about blame, increased
workload, and fear of litigation were some of the main barriers to incident reports (Grant,
Donaldson, & Larsen, 2006; Martowirono, Jansma, Luijk, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2012).
Martowirno et al. (2012) conducted a qualitative study that showed how negative
attitudes of residents working in a hospital setting negatively affected their error reporting
pattern. Barriers to reporting included a lengthy reporting system and a perceived lack of
organizational actions to fix patient safety issues. Staff members’ willingness to speak up
and report incidents are part of the core principles of a just culture model (Marx, 2001).
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Addressing staff attitude toward behaviors that support the just culture model were a
critical part of the just culture interactive workshop training.
Subjective Norms
Lastly, intent to perform is influenced by subjective norms, which is the peer
pressure to carry out or not to carry out a specific action. Unit level culture is driven by
subjective norms established by formal and informal leaders or persons with influence as
to what an approved behavior is and what it is not. Ajzen referred to these leaders as
“important others” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 195). A study that measured fearfulness related to
criticism from others demonstrated that participant’s subjective norms were significant
positive predictors of intent to exercise only for those participants who scored high on
fear of negative evaluation scores. There were no significant impacts of subjective norms
on those who had a lower fear of negative evaluation scores (Latimer & Ginis, 2005).
This study demonstrated that individuals who have a lower perception of psychological
safety and fear of consequences may be more influenced by social norms than those with
higher perception of psychological safety.
All three components, including perceived behavioral control, behavioral
attitudes, and subjective norms influenced behavioral achievement either individually or
together depending on the circumstances and desired action. TBP theory is congruent
with the just culture model as in both frameworks behavioral achievement can be directly
correlated with perceived behavioral control coupled with behavioral intention. In a just
culture model, when an error is investigated, the first step is to establish the intention of
the person involved in the error, and the subsequent steps allow for evaluating the role of
at-risk behaviors. A key component in just culture implementation is assisting employees
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to identify at-risk behaviors and reflect upon their own behavioral control, which depends
on their perception of the ease or challenges in performing that behavior (Côté, Gagnon,
Houme, Abdeljelil, & Gagnon, 2012). In order to sustain a just culture model, this theory
emphasized that interventions should focus on changing perceptions of subjective norms
towards one that embraces speaking up, peer to peer feedback, and reporting errors even
if it involves a colleague.
Complementary to this theory, Kantar’s (1993) theory of structural empowerment
supported creating an environment for staff that allows them to access appropriate
resources and support to make critical decisions (Larken, Cierpial, Stack, Morrison, &
Griffith, 2008). Literature showed a strong correlation between empowerment and having
equity, ownership, partnership, and accountability (Barden, Griffin, Donahue, &
Fitzpatrick, 2011). These are also part of just culture concepts. Equity encourages an
atmosphere where employees are working collectively with fair distribution of
opportunities and informal power. Ownership encourages aligning ones work with the
organizational mission and values, and partnership encourages working towards
organizations mission and goals collaboratively and collectively. Lastly, accountability
refers to taking responsibility for decision making and being cognizant of decisions that
affect individual and team outcomes (Barden et al., 2011). Theory of structural
empowerment has been widely applied to nursing practice, showing the relationship
between empowerment and increased commitment, accountability, and accomplishments
of positive outcomes at work. Psychological empowerment leads to feelings of autonomy
and importance in a team setting, and needing to make a strong contribution toward the
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mission of the organization (Larkin et al., 2008). Employees who are empowered are
more committed and, therefore, able to engage fully in the just culture concepts. The
theoretical framework is further illustrated in Figure 3 below.

Just Culture & Empowerment

Behavioral Beliefs

Intention

Perceived
Behavioral
Control

Subjective
Norms

Behavior

Figure 3. Combined planned behavior and empowerment theoretical framework modified
model base on theories of Kantar and Ajzen. Permission provided for original model of
Ajzen for noncommercial use (Ajzen, 2000; Côté et al., 2012; Larkin, Cervical, Starck,
Morrison, & Griffith, 2008).
Summary
Minimal research has been conducted on implementation of just culture principles
and the relationship with employee perception of patient safety culture. Studies have
shown that a strong patient safety culture has a major influence on staff members’ ability
to detect and respond to unexpected events. Interventions to improve patient safety
should focus on the unit level of the organization where care delivery occurs. Employees
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at microsystem levels have the ability to determine whether a negative outcome has
occurred and to detect and report events prior to the harm reaching the patient. Employee
empowerment to increase error reporting will lead to safer systems for patients. Just
culture environment supports professional development of employees by creating the
framework for collaboration and shared decision making. The main component of the
just culture model includes creating a psychological safe environment, using of a just
culture algorithm, empowering employees to speak up, and increasing adverse event and
near miss reporting. Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (TPB) in combination with
Kantar’s theory of structured empowerment was utilized as a framework for developing
the just culture model interactive workshop content for the project intervention. It is
important to recognize the impact perceived and actual behavioral control, employee
attitudes, and social norms have on influencing behavioral choices as described in
Ajzen’s TPB. Employees who are empowered are more committed and, therefore, able
to engage fully in the just culture model. The just culture model of transparency, trust,
and open communication improved perceptions of safety and increased behaviors of
adverse event or near miss reporting without fear of reprisal. Section 3 will describe the
methods used to conduct this project.
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Section 3: Approach
Introduction
The purpose of this project was to explore the impact of a just culture model
interactive workshop on employees’ perceptions related to overall safety, nonpunitive
response to error, communication openness, teamwork, feedback and communication,
frequency of event reporting, and hospital management support for patient safety. This
section addresses the project design, methodology, population, measurement instrument,
data collection process, and data management and analysis.
Project Design/Methods
Project Design
The type of project design depends on the purpose, problem, population, and
desired outcome for applicability of research findings to practice (Burns & Grove, 2009).
The design chosen for this project fit my intent to focus on possible generalization to the
hospital acute care staff population or the organization. The design of the project
involved 3 stages (see Figure 4): (a) a preintervention patient safety culture quantitative
questionnaire, (b) a face-to-face interactive workshop session, and (c) a postintervention
patient safety quantitative questionnaire.
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O1

• Administration of Pre-test Safety
Culture Perception Questionnaire
• Presentation of Just Culture
Workshop Session

X
O2

• Administration of Post-test Safety
Culture Perception Questionnaire

Figure 4. Three stages of just culture project design.
Experimental designs that are randomized with a control group and intervention
group are the strongest research designs (Terry, 2012). In this project, due to the focus on
culture change, it was not possible to have tightly controlled randomization with a control
group. In these situations, quasi-experimental designs are recommended with the
awareness of other variables that may affect the conclusions of the study (Brown, 2009).
A quasi-experimental one group pretest-intervention-posttest design was used to analyze
cause and effect between a just culture model interactive workshop and employee
perceptions of patient safety culture (Burns & Grove, 2009). This design was also
feasible within this project’s timeline and resource constraints.
For this project, the independent variable was the implementation of a just culture
model interactive workshop, and the dependent variables were staff perceptions in the
patient safety dimensions measured in the pretest and posttest questionnaire. Table 1
further illustrates the connection among purpose, question, and measurement.
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Table 1
Purpose, Question, Measure
Project purpose
The purpose of this

Question
Will patient safety culture

Measure
Use of HSPSC quantitative

quantitative project was to

scores show a significant

tool to measure staff

explore the influence of a

difference in the staff’s

perception on safety culture

just culture model

perceptions in the safety

dimensions using Likert

interactive workshop on

dimensions of overall

scale, pre just culture model

employee safety culture

perception of safety,

interactive workshop

perception in dimensions of

nonpunitive response to

implementation and 2 weeks

overall perception of safety,

error, communication

postimplementation. The

nonpunitive response to

openness, teamwork,

questionnaire will be

error, teamwork,

feedback and

administered anonymously

communication openness,

communication, frequency

with no identifiers or

feedback and

of event reporting, and

demographic information.

communication, hospital

hospital management

management support for

support for patient safety

patient safety, and

after participation in a just

frequency of event

culture model interactive

reporting, measured pre and

workshop?

postintervention.
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A researcher needs to consider and minimize threats to internal validity when
using a quasi-experimental one-group pretest-intervention-posttest design (Slack &
Draugalis, 2001). Statistical association may not imply casual association. Dimitrov and
Rumrill (2003) indicated that pretest/posttest quasi-experimental designs have threats
related to history, maturation, randomization, instrumentation, and mortality. The major
weakness in this quasi-experimental design is the lack of randomization (Shadish et al.,
2002). However, due to variability that exists in unit-level culture; it was not deemed
beneficial to use a control group for this project. In addition, withholding of safety culture
based training for any group may have caused inconsistencies in patient safety practices
and may have contributed to potential patient safety issues. Research has shown that unitlevel team communication and shared perceptions of value and safety are important to
developing a positive safety culture; therefore, all acute care staff were invited to be part
of the just culture model interactive workshop (Stavianopoulos, 2012). Because
controlling for confounding variables is difficult due to lack of randomization, it is
important to maximize the control and address plausible threats (Shadish, Cook, &
Campbell, 2002). Therefore, I focused on minimizing the three major threats to this
project: maturation, regression, and mortality.
Maturation is a phenomenon that could threaten the validity of causal
relationships between the project variables of staff perception and the intervention. The
maturation effect is related to other influences that could potentially occur between the
first and second measure in addition to the intervention (Slack & Draugalis, 2001). For
this project, potential maturation threats from changes in management, processes, and
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external variables such as the introduction of other new safety education initiatives were
evaluated and not found. The participant received the pretest immediately prior to starting
the workshop and the posttest within 2 weeks after the workshop to minimize unforeseen
maturation threats.
The regression phenomenon may impact the relationship between the intervention
and improvement seen in scores from pretest to posttest (Dimitrov & Rumrill, 2003). In
this project, the variable that might have impacted regression effects between the two
scores was the challenge participants might have in providing honest answers about
sensitive personal perceptions of patient safety culture, which included their own, their
team, and leadership actions. The sensitivity of the questions might have caused the
participants to score higher or similarly on the posttest questionnaire. I informed the
participants about the anonymity of both tests. For this project, no identifying
information, including demographic data, was included on the survey. In addition, the
survey was gathered and placed in a folder or administered online in order to not identify
any particular individual who might have participated.
The third threat evaluated for this project is referred to as mortality, which is the
dropout rate of participants from the pretest to the posttest (Slack & Draugalis, 2001). To
increase participation in the study, the presenter of the just culture workshop sent several
e-mails and met with managers to encourage them to send employees to the workshop
who were interested in attending. The sample size was dependent on the number of
employees who attended the workshop, as the study included a convenience sample from
workshop attendees. The 2-week timeframe between the pretest and the posttest may

54
have caused attrition. Participants may have dropped out for reasons of unavailability,
lack of continued interest, or other unforeseen barriers. I designed the posttest in a webbased format that made it easier for participants to provide anonymous responses at their
designated work computers when convenient, and they were provided a 2-week period to
complete the posttest.
Measurement Instrument
For the quantitative questionnaire data, ordinal measurement was appropriate, as
it provided measurement of the 5 categories or responses with labels on a Likert scale
(strongly agree to strongly disagree; Polit, 2010). The pretest and posttest questionnaires
were designed to be the same, using the AHRQ HSPSC, which has been widely used to
measure patient safety culture perceptions in healthcare. All of the HSPSC survey
dimensions were pilot tested by the developers and found to have acceptable reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63 to 0.84) and validity with each dimension (AHRQ, 2008). The
dimensions of safety culture that were included in this study were overall perception of
safety, nonpunitive response to error, communication openness, teamwork, feedback and
communication, hospital management support for patient safety, and frequency of event
reporting (AHRQ, 2008).
Interactive Workshop Design
It is essential to tailor interactive workshops to the audience in order for effective
learning to occur. “Learning is the act or process by which behavior change, knowledge,
skills, and attitudes are acquired” (Boyd et al., as cited in Knowles, Holton, & Swanson,
2005, p. 10). In the adult learner, the desire from within is what motivates one to learn
new skills or build on old skills (Conklin, 1995). The just culture model workshop was
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offered as an optional course, which allowed participants to choose to attend a learning
session.
For the development of the workshop structure, I used the whole-part-whole
learning model (WPW learning model). The main elements of WPW learning model
provided a structure for rhythmic adult learning by giving the learner an overall
framework to grasp new concepts that were introduced (first whole), to convey related
concepts that were broken down (parts), and to provide a summation of (second whole)
how the “parts” are interrelated (Knowles et al., 2005). Clear objectives and definitions
were developed to convey the just culture model message as a “whole” at the start of the
workshop. The beginning of the workshop incorporated a short 5-minute video
illustrating the effects of medical errors on the patient and family to draw the
participants’ attention. The workshop design continued in “parts” by breaking down each
concept of a just culture Model and providing opportunities for participation in the form
of case studies, video vignettes, discussions, and role playing. Examples provided were
built on real scenarios in the healthcare setting to allow the participants to connect to the
message being delivered (Conklin, 1995). Toward the end of the presentation, the
participants were provided examples of improvement changes and a video illustrating a
hospital’s journey from a punitive culture to a just culture model for patient safety to
integrate the concepts as a “whole” learned in the workshop.
The participants were provided a 90-minute just culture workshop session in a
conference room setting at the urban medical center. The seating was arranged around an
oval table to stimulate discussion and group work. The presenter used a projector for
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PowerPoint and video presentations. The workshop session had built in time for pretest
completion prior to the start of the session and for question and evaluation at the end.
Just culture Workshop Intervention
The intervention was a just culture model interactive workshop using the
combined theory of planned behavior (TPB) and structural empowerment theory as a
framework for the content delivered. TPB emphasizes the degree to which actual and
perceived control, attitude toward behavior, and subjective norms influence an
individual’s intent to change behavior or perform a task. The just culture model
interactive workshop incorporated the TPB concepts in creating awareness of how
control, perception attitude, and work unit norms may influence intent to apply the
components of a just culture. The participants were introduced to concepts of
accountability, risk-taking behaviors, systems analysis, incident reporting, and speaking
up to prevent patient harm. Senior leadership support for the just culture model
implementation was reiterated several times during the workshop in order to increase
employees’ perception of empowerment and psychological safety in participating in a
just culture model of high reliability and accountability. During the presentation of each
of the workshop, participants were encouraged to think about a change they could affect
in their work area; overcoming the challenges of TPB.
The workshop incorporated a combination of PowerPoint lecture, video
presentations, and case studies. Simulation training techniques were used with actual
clinical scenarios in order to engage the participants, provide opportunities to role play,
and practice new skills and knowledge (Secomb, Mckenna, & Smith, 2012). Studies have
shown significant decreases in the occurrence of errors and the ability of staff to evaluate
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their own performance without patient compromise with the utilization of simulation
training (Ford et al., 2010; Mullen & Byrd, 2013). The just culture workshop provided
participants the opportunity to practice in a safe environment using speak up tools, event
investigation with the just culture algorithm tool, peer to peer feedback, and staff
accountability in behavioral choices. An interactive learning environment allowed the
participants to practice critical thinking skills and communication, which led to
understanding of the content (Ford et al., 2010). The video vignettes used in this training
were obtained from YouTube and were only used for educational purposes; they will not
be distributed without copyright permissions.
I developed the just culture workshop content and material with footnotes and a
facilitator guide and reviewed the materials with the presenter. The presenter had the
opportunity to practice the presentation prior to the workshop (see Appendix C). The
objectives and activities planned for the just culture workshop are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Just culture Workshop Learning Objectives and Activities
Objectives
List learner’s objectives in
behavioral terms
“The participant will be
able to…”
*Introductions and
prequestionnaire
1. Describe current
prevalence and key
definitions related to patient
safety.
2. Describe the concepts and
principles of just culture.

3. Identify type of errors and
human behaviors that
contribute to near misses or
adverse events through use
of just culture algorithm.
4. Use the three Ws
communication tool to stop
the line.
5. Describe key components
of reporting adverse events
and near misses.

*Evaluation wrap up

Content (Topics)
Outline of the content for each
objective.

Time frame
State time frame
in minutes for
each objective

Overview of class session;
expectations; ground rules
Overview of pre and post
questionnaire
Patient safety introduction
-Prevalence of errors
-Reporting culture

15 minutes

Just culture
-History of safety culture
-Just culture model & core concepts;
organizational values
-High-reliability organizations
-Type of errors & mitigation
-Type of failures & mitigation
-Type of behaviors & mitigation
-Factors influencing behaviors
- Use of just culture algorithm

10 minutes

Stop the line/speak up strategies
-Purpose & tool

15 minutes

Adverse-event reporting
-Barriers
-Near-miss reporting
-Benefits of reporting
-Electronic reporting system—ePER
Unit-level improvements
Organizational-level improvements
Review of the main concepts of just
culture
Complete evaluation form

10 minutes

10 minutes

20 minutes,

10 minutes
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Protection of Human Subjects and Confidentiality
Permission for the project was obtained from Walden University Institutional
Review Board (IRB) and the local urban medical center IRB and Quality Improvement
Counsel. After IRB approval, participant recruitment and project announcements took
place. I utilized the consent form approved by Walden University IRB with approval
number of 05-28-14-0345756. Strategies for participant recruitment and anonymous data
collection described in more detail below were applied according to IRB application
specifications.
Population and Sampling
The project took place in an urban medical center in the Northeast region of the
U. S. The majority of the population served at this medical center is over 65 years old and
no care is provided for persons under 18 years old. A convenient sample is an
inexpensive way to obtain participants and fit the purpose of this project (Burns & Grove,
2009). The employees of 4 acute care units who provided direct clinical care were the
targeted population for the project. Based on an 80% confidence level calculation, the
desired sample size was 76 participants from the population of 139 staff members. Based
on history of staff participation in patient safety culture events and perception surveys, a
low sample size was anticipated. Past patient safety survey culture analysis in this facility
showed only 30% staff participation out of the total number of medical center employees;
an identified limitation to the project (NCPS, 2011).
The quasi-experimental single sample pretest and posttest design focused on
evaluating the impact of a just culture model interactive workshop on safety culture
perceptions of clinical care employees working in acute care units. The project did not
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have a control group as it was found not feasible and unethical to withhold the workshop
from some. All clinical staff of the acute care units were included ranging from novice to
expert employees and inclusive of all cultural, gender, and age demographics. The
exclusion criteria included all managers and supervisors of the units, all non-clinical staff
of the acute care units, and all other employees not working in acute care units. The
targeted population was clinical staff members from the acute care units, and managers
and supervisors were not allowed to attend the workshop or participate in the project. It
was important that managers and supervisors were excluded from the workshop to
maintain open and honest discussion with employees without fear of disclosure.
The recruitment of participants began after I obtained approval from Walden
University IRB. I provided a just culture project flyer to each of the acute care units. The
flyer included explanation of the study purpose and its voluntary nature and a description
of the measures used to protect anonymity and confidentiality of the information
collected. The flyer also included my contact information to address any further questions
staff might have had. I was prepared to attend staff meetings at nurse manager discretion
or invitation to discuss the flyer information, but there was none. I did not send out an email message with the consent and pretest online questionnaire prior to the workshop to
ensure that participants who filled out the questionnaire attend the workshop session.
Data Collection
Prior to the start of the just culture model interactive workshop sessions, the
participants were provided with the consent form (Appendix A) and the HSPSC
questionnaire (see Appendix B). I explained the consent and pretest and participants were
given 15 minutes to complete the pretest. Those workshop attendees who chose to
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participate filled out the HSPSC questionnaire and placed it in a folder. I collected the
folder with the pre-workshop questionnaires after 15 minutes, and the presenter started
conducting the workshop. The folder was placed in sealed large envelope and kept in a
locked file cabinet. I informed the participants there would be a posttest questionnaire
provided 2 weeks after the workshop was completed if they wished to continue to
participate in the project. The participants were not informed that the posttest posed the
same questions as the pretest. I entered the pretest questionnaire data into an Excel
spreadsheet with ID numbers starting from one, which was saved in a locked folder only
accessible by computer login code issued to me.
The acute care managers received request via email, 2 weeks after the just culture
model interactive workshop, to distribute link to an anonymous web-based posttest
questionnaire that included the same consent and questions as the pretest questionnaire,
for the acute care nurses who attended the workshop to complete. The questionnaire link
could not be directly sent to each participant as the project was anonymous without any
identifying information including demographic information. The postintervention
questionnaire was the same as the pretest questionnaire including the consent form (see
Appendices A & B). The postintervention consent and questionnaire link was sent again
after a week to the managers of the acute care units to send out to staff to remind those
who had completed the pretest and still wanted to continue participating to complete the
posttest. The posttest results were collected via web-based application and printed for
record keeping and analysis; then stored in a locked cabinet. The web link was closed and
discontinued after 15 days. Data were entered into the same Excel spreadsheet as the
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pretest on a different worksheet and kept in a secure online folder only accessible by my
personal log in code.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using statistical analysis tool R version 3.1.1 and Microsoft
Excel 2010. Quantitative data analysis included identification of incomplete survey
questions, response rates, and frequency of responses. Descriptive statistics was used to
analyze the variables included in the questionnaire. Welch’s t-test was utilized to rank
and analyze the data. This test is appropriate when there is no pairing of pre and posttest
data, uneven pre and posttest sample size, and a small sample size. Participant
questionnaire scores were measured before and after the training intervention to analyze
whether there was a significant increase in perception of safety culture (Polit, 2010). The
Excel spreadsheets containing the anonymous data were shared with a statistician to
assist with the statistical analysis.
Summary
An organization committed to safety fosters an environment of open
communication, trust, continuous improvement, and error and near miss reporting
without fear of reprisal. There are significant reasons for studying the effects of a safety
culture on employee perception of safety. A just culture allows an organization to achieve
a safety culture by clearly defining expectations and shared accountability. Maintaining
anonymity and the voluntary nature and security of the project was essential to ensure the
integrity, met ethical requirements for research, and gain the trust of employees. Utilizing
the quasi-experimental pretest and posttest methodology allowed for evaluation of the
effect of the just culture model interactive workshop on acute care clinical staff
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perception of safety with considerations of potential threats and limitations of the results.
The just culture model interactive workshop can have a great impact on reducing patient
harm from errors. The project results, which will be discussed in Section 4, will allow the
organization to develop further targeted strategies to address negative perceptions which
could lead to a culture change conducive to increased reporting, discussing, and learning
from adverse events that occur in the context of providing care.
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Section 4: Discussion and Implications
Introduction
The project measured perceptions of patient safety culture for the dimensions of
overall perception of safety, nonpunitive response to error, communication openness,
teamwork, feedback and communication, frequency of event reporting, and hospital
management support for patient safety before and 2 weeks after a just culture model
interactive workshop. The discussion in this chapter provides the findings, which include
tables and charts for easy reference. The project did not include any demographic data to
maintain the anonymity of respondents. The findings include the overall score for
perception of safety and individual score comparisons for the pretest and posttest on each
of the dimensions listed above. The results allow for formulating implications and
conclusions as well as suggestions for further research needs on this topic.
Discussion of Findings
In the current literature, there is limited research on the effect or impact of a just
culture model on employee perceptions of patient safety culture. This project highlighted
the changes in perception of patient safety culture before and after exposure to a just
culture model interactive workshop. From an acute care clinical staff population of 139 at
the urban medical center, 44 employees participated in the just culture model interactive
workshop. Out of the attendees, 33 employees volunteered to participate in the project
and completed the pretest patient safety culture perception questionnaire (Appendix B).
Two pretest questionnaires were removed from the project for having a significant
amount of missing data, over 10%. 2 weeks after the workshop, 24 of the participants
completed the posttest questionnaire (Appendix B). Convenience sampling was used;
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therefore, there was no randomization, and normalization could not be assumed. The
demographic characteristics of the sample were not collected to increase anonymity of an
expected small sample size. Welch’s t test was chosen to analyze the data collected for
this quasi-experimental project with small sample size, unknown variability, and unequal
sample sizes. The null hypothesis was tested to determine whether the data showed no
significant difference in safety culture perception scores pre and postintervention.
Welch’s t test allowed for testing regardless of whether there was a significant difference
in scores and whether the differences were positive or negative.
The t test results showed that the total patient safety culture perception pretest
mean and posttest mean differed significantly (t = 2.7, p < 0.01). Posttest overall scores
(µ=3.7) were significantly higher than pretest scores (µ=3.5; see Table 3). This was
confirmed through a power analysis of 94% (n=631, delta=0.2, type="two sample").
These findings refuted the null hypothesis that overall patient safety culture perception
scores would not show significant improvement after participation in a just culture model
interactive workshop. This finding is supported by a previous similar study indicating
significant improvement in overall safety climate and safety culture scores after
implementation of training related to teamwork and communication (Weaver et al.,
2013).
Table 3
Welch’s t Test Total Safety Perception Score
Overall
score

Mean
pretest
3.5

Mean
posttest
3.7

95% CL
lower
-0.284

95% CL
upper
-0.045

T

df

P-value

-2.7028

1244.813

0.006969
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The overall percentage of positive results was analyzed for the safety dimensions
pretest and posttest (see Figure 5). Percentages for each of the dimensions were
calculated by dividing the total positive responses to the questions in each dimension by
the total number of responses. Appropriate determinations of positive responses were
made for the questionnaires that were reversely worded. The results showed an increase
in percentage of positive responses in the dimension of overall perception of safety (pre
55%, post 68%), teamwork within hospitals(pre 60%, post 88%), communication
openness (pre 68%, post 75%), and frequency of event reporting (pre 72%, post 92%).
Interestingly, nonpunitive response to error (pre 60.2%, post 59.7%) and feedback and
communication about errors (pre 90.3%, post 90.2%) showed no difference, while
hospital management support (pre 70%, post 61%) showed a slight decrease from pretest
to posttest scores. While the increase in percentage of positive responses indicated a
change in participants’ perceptions on these dimensions, further detailed analysis was
conducted to support the significance and accept or deny the null hypothesis associated
with each dimension.
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Positive Pretest & Posttest Safety Perception Questionnaire Results by Domains
Pretest

Posttest

% of Positive Responses

100.00%
80.00%

60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%

Figure 5. Safety culture dimension pre and post measures.
Furthermore, Welch’s t test was conducted for each dimension pretest and posttest
on the safety perception dimensions of nonpunitive response to error, communication
openness, teamwork, feedback and communication, and hospital management support for
patient safety and outcome related measures of overall perception of safety and frequency
of event reporting. The 24 questions were divided into the appropriate dimension, with
each dimension having 3 to 4 questions. Composite scores of the mean of each of the
questions were computed for each dimension after reverse coding for appropriate
questions in accordance with AHRQ—Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Survey
Guide (AHRQ, 2008). Each domain was analyzed using Welch’s t test. The results
showed which dimension had higher, lower, or unchanged perception scores
postintervention from pretest scores. The p value was computed to determine whether to
accept or reject the null hypothesis and whether there was significant negative or positive
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difference in pretest and posttest scores. A significant Welch’s t test finding does not
determine direct correlation between variables tested but does provide information
regarding which variables show the strongest possible relationship with the intervention
conducted (Polit, 2010).
Welch’s t test results showed a significant difference in mean scores related to
Dimensions 3, 4, and 7, which were teamwork, communication openness, and frequency
of event reporting, respectively, before and after the just culture workshop intervention
(see Table 4). However, the increase in mean scores related to the dimension of overall
safety perception was not found to be statistically significant; therefore, the null
hypothesis was accepted. The data for each of these dimensions are explained in more
detail below.
Table 4
Welch’s t Test for All Safety Dimensions
Mean
pretest
3.232

Mean
posttest
3.379

95% CL lower

95% CL upper

-0.1416746

0.4365812

Nonpunitive response to
error

3.357

3.505

-0.1627373

Teamwork
Communication openness

3.50
3.17

3.86
3.54

Feedback about errors

3.87

Hospital management
support
Frequency of event
reporting

Overall perception of
safety

T

df

p-value

1.005

211.26

0.32

0.4592043

0.941

158.93

0.348

0.6049033
-0.71147574

-0.124263
-0.027771

-2.990
-2.135

209.15
156.73

0.00311
0.03426

3.97

-0.4234337

0.2209247

-0.620

153.55

0.5356

3.66

3.88

-0.5615858

0.1234137

-1.263

159.73

0.2083

3.50

3.92

-0.77329094

-0.060042

-2.307

159.86

0.02231

It was predicted that there would be a relationship between a just culture model
interactive workshop and perception scores related to teamwork. The questions that made
up the composite score for the teamwork measure included the following:
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In my hospital work area/unit, people support one another.



In my hospital work area/unit, when a lot of work needs to be done quickly,
we work together as a team to get the work done.



In my hospital work area/unit, people treat each other with respect; and in my
hospital work area/unit, when one area in this unit gets really busy; others help
out (AHRQ, 2004).

The mean perception score related to teamwork increased in the posttest (M=
3.86) results as compared to the pretest (M= 3.50). The difference in the mean score was
statistically significant from pretest to posttest, (t = 2.99, p < 0.05). The increase in
positive responses indicates potential influence of the just culture model interactive
workshop in changing perceptions of the participants related to the strength of teamwork
between the unit staff. Although no other studies were found that measured the
relationship between implementing a just culture model and improved teamwork, studies
using CRM training for enhancing teams and communication found a positive correlation
between CRM training implementation and improvement in teamwork and
communication scores (3.7 to 4.4, p < .05) using the CTS Likert scale measurement tool
(Paull et al., 2013). The significant finding in increased teamwork scores is important, as
most failures in healthcare have been shown to be associated with nontechnical cultural
factors such as breakdown in communication and teamwork (Khatri et al., 2009).
There was a statistically significant difference in the fourth dimension (see Table
4), which is communication openness scores from pretest (M = 3.17) to posttest (M =
3.54), (t = 2.14, p < 0.05). The questions that pertained to this domain were as follows: In
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my hospital work area/unit, staff will freely speak up if they see something that may
negatively affect patient care; in my hospital work area/unit, staff feel free to question the
decisions or actions of those with more authority; and in my hospital work area/unit, staff
are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right (AHRQ, 2004). Studies
have shown that empowerment from managers and supervisors promoting open
communication positively affect employee perception of feeling safe to speak up (Garon,
2012). The ability to communicate openly promotes safe patient care and reduces
organizational incidents and liability. Skills such as situational awareness and speaking
up are important for prevention of adverse events and communication failures (Polito,
2013; Reid, 2012). Leaders are not able to address organizational issues and system
failures when there is a lack of open communication and transparency (Garon, 2012). The
workshop emphasized the role of effective communication providing the participants the
NCPS 3 W tool, which stands for “What I see, What I’m concerned about, and What I
want,” with opportunity to role play and practice using the tool during the workshop
(NCPS, n.d.).
There was a statistically significant difference in frequency of error reporting
dimension scores from pretest (M = 3.50) to posttest (M = 3.92), (t = 2.31, p < 0.05). The
questions under this dimension included the following: When a mistake is made in your
hospital work area/unit but it is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how
often is it reported? When a mistake is made in your hospital work area/unit but has no
potential to harm the patient, how often is it reported? When a mistake is made in your
hospital work area/unit and it could harm the patient but does not, how often is it
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reported? (AHRQ, 2004). According to Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (TPB), staff
perceptions can be used to predict actual behavioral choices, and the higher the
perception, the more likely the individual will carry out the behavior (Ajzen, 1991).
Therefore, a positive change in the frequency of error reporting mean perception scores
may indicate an increase in willingness to report errors and near-miss events. An increase
in error reporting will be significant for improved organizational learning and change, as
current literature shows that only 4% to 50% of adverse events are reported every year
(Breathnach et al., 2011; Sarvadikar et al., 2010).
Similar results were achieved in a study that demonstrated the effects of a targeted
intervention, where incident report data showed a 5-times increase in near-miss reporting
compared to adverse events during an 18-month period post intensive error reporting
training (Frankel et al., 2006). Literature showed that training alone cannot sustain
behavioral change such as increased reporting of events. Organizational leadership
commitment to safety and acknowledgment of the high-risk nature of healthcare are
essential to provide employees with highly reliable systems and a psychologically safe
environment in order to sustain a just culture, manage errors, learn as an organization,
and improve the delivery of quality and safe care (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013; Singh et al.,
2013; Starvrianopoulos, 2012).
In the safety perception dimensions of overall perception of safety, there were no
significant changes in perception scores from the pretest (M=3.23) to the posttest
(M=3.38), (t=1.0, p=0.35). In addition, there were no significant changes in scores for the
domains of feedback and communication, from pretest (M=3.87) to posttest (M=3.97),
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(t=0.62, p=0.54) and hospital management support from pretest (M=3.66) to posttest
(3.88), (t=1.26, p=0.21). Interestingly, while there was a significant increase in mean
perception scores of frequency of error reporting, similar results were not found in mean
perception scores of nonpunitive response to error from pretest (M = 3.36) to posttest (M
= 3.51), (t = 0.94, p =0.35). Research has shown correlations between nonpunitive
response to error and the error reporting patterns of staff. In one study, team
psychological safety was found to be positively related to reported errors (β=0.28, p <
0.05; Leroy et al., 2012). Similarly, in another study, significant relationships were
discovered between willingness to report and nonpunitive response to error and the
number of reported events (p<0.01; Smits et al., 2012).
In this current project, nonpunitive response to error perception scores was similar
pre and postintervention, even though perception scores related to error reporting
frequency increased. The results may be explained by the new knowledge and skills
participants gained during the workshop related to the importance of error reporting,
especially near-miss events to prevent harm from reaching the patient. Unfortunately, the
increase in error reporting perception scores may not be sustained unless employees truly
feel that the current culture supports and allows for open reporting of errors without fear
of reprisal or punishment.
Culture change takes time, and it is not surprising that feedback and
communication, hospital management support for patient safety, and overall perception
of safety scores did not show significant change in a 2-week period postintervention.
Time, commitment, patience, and trust are required for an organization to unravel
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unhealthy behaviors that have become the norm and refocus management and employees
toward its mission, core beliefs, and values (Marx, 2001; Sheard, 2014). Employees may
still feel that the safety culture is punitive and not just or fair until management begins to
role model the just culture principles in everyday interactions with their employees. A
positive safety culture is promoted through senior management commitment to safety;
shared concern and accountability between staff and management for risks; having
reliable systems; and continual organizational learning through monitoring, analysis, and
feedback (El-Jardali et al., 2011). Managers need to provide real-time feedback and
communication continually about errors using the just culture algorithm and support for
patient safety through process improvement, creating opportunities for employees’
professional growth and involvement in the organization. Nurse Managers play a key role
in modeling safety behaviors and cultivating nurses’ roles in the delivery of evidencebased safe care (Mantynen et al., 2014). Over time, it is expected that employees will feel
psychologically safe to participate in teamwork, report errors, speak up to prevent risks,
effectively communicate with colleagues, and trust that management will provide the
necessary support (Kohn et al., 2000).
In summary, the project supported continual employee and management training
using the just culture model interactive workshop with further emphasis on topics such as
senior leadership engagement and empowerment for nonpunitive response to errors
related to human errors and at-risk behaviors. Analysis of the data indicated that
introduction of the just culture model through staff engagement in an interactive
workshop produced some significant changes in safety culture perceptions and that
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further research in this area is warranted. The project has also helped to indicate the need
to augment the intervention to produce more positive results in all the dimensions
studied.
Implications
The intent of the just culture model is to guide hospital leaders and employees in
responding to errors and near misses appropriately by creating environments of trust and
psychological safety to prevent patient harm. The just culture model emphasizes errors
can by reduced or eliminated in healthcare through actions including:


always anticipating risks and errors,



being a learning and proactive culture;



being accountable for ones actions;



building high reliable systems and



Building monitoring systems monitor drifts in practices (Marx, 2001).

For this reason, it is important for healthcare facilities to evaluate their current
patient safety culture perceptions through ongoing surveys. The results of this project
provide management greater understanding regarding organizational and unit level
culture in the dimensions that are associated with just culture principles as the hospital
continues the journey towards the just culture model for patient safety operations.
The just culture model has potential for becoming the gold standard for patient
safety across the nation. North Carolina and Minnesota have demonstrated how to
achieve a greater impact in reducing harm to patients through their statewide
collaborations on just culture initiatives. In order for the just culture model to have
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maximum impact, all of the four main concepts of just culture should be referred to as
“the bundle” that must be implemented together. These concepts include establishing a
psychologically safe environment, using a just culture algorithm, speaking up to prevent
risks, and reporting events need to be operationalized. The majority of the current studies
were focused on examining punitive versus nonpunitive culture, teamwork and
communication strategies, and the impact on patient safety. There is minimal research on
the impact of a just culture model (“the bundle”) on employee perceptions of safety, error
reporting patterns, and reduction in events causing patient harm. This project has laid the
foundation for future studies to build on.
Recommended future research includes conducting qualitative and quantitative
studies related to implementation of a just culture model and the relationship or impact on
practice change measuring variables such as use of the just culture algorithm, trends in
error reporting, staff behavioral choices, risk taking behavior, safety culture perceptions,
and speaking up. Studies can also be implemented on examining specific safety practices
such as analyzing the impact of a just culture model on hand hygiene compliance
behaviors of staff.
Lastly, it is recommended that future studies collect demographical data, which
were lacking in this project. The availability of demographical information could assist in
further analyzing the data for groups with lower scores in order to target interventions as
well as identifying groups with higher scores for learning opportunities. Organizational
culture is built on sub-cultures; therefore, each unit culture within the organization would
be expected show differences.
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Project Strengths and Limitations
The strengths of this project included utilization of a reliable instrument in
measuring pre and postintervention data. The project was based on a sound theoretical
framework that addressed four strong factors that influence the adoption of a culture
change in the organization. The just culture model interactive workshop was developed
using current evidence-based resources and a learning model to enhance the adult
learning experience. The interventions are easily transferable and the education plan and
materials can be utilized to teach just culture to other settings including healthcare
students. Although the sample size was small, there were significant findings in this
project that can be utilized in developing future studies related to just culture
implementation. There is currently limited research conducted on this topic and this
project provides a framework for future study designs on patient safety culture change.
Limitations of this quasi-experimental design included the unknown variability
within the sample. There may be limitations as to whether the sample was a true
representation of the targeted population of acute care staff. It was not possible to
randomize the population of acute care nurses; therefore, a convenience sample was used
for subject identification. There was a threat to validity due to mortality of participants
from the pretest to the posttest time frame creating unequal sample sizes in the pretest
and posttest groups. Lastly, the absence of a control group and attrition rate may have
contributed to the significant findings in the data.
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Analysis of Self
In this section, I will highlight the significant positive gain I have experienced in
my knowledge, competency, and practice through my Doctor of Nursing Practice
program in each of the following domains of leadership, Advance Nursing Practice,
Promoting Quality Improvement, Improving Health Outcomes, and Informing Health
Policies.
Leadership
I was afforded multiple opportunities to apply advance leadership skills gained
through my courses in settings of my practicum experience and through my capstone
project completion journey. I learned characteristics of an effective leader, particularly a
transformational leader. Transformational leaders are influential through their ability to
aspire willing followers; create synergy between the leaders and followers where both
parties uplift the other’s motivation, ethics, and human conduct (Best, 2010; Thompson,
2012). I was accepted to participate in a facility’s leadership development program and
attended various leadership classes including 7 Habits of Highly Effective People,
Crucial Conversations for Leaders, Human Resources for Leaders, Yellow Belt training,
and Dynamic and Effective Presentations. I have utilized these skills in my daily practice
as well as my practicum setting.
I had opportunities to assume a leadership role in initiating my project by
fostering collaborative relationships with stakeholders, communicating effectively both
through oral presentations and writing, seeking leadership education, and participating in
professional organizations. I organized a half day patient safety conference for executive
leadership of multiple medical centers (directors, associate directors, nurse executives,
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and others) including a national director for patient safety as key note speaker focused on
high reliability organization and the just culture model. After I presented key points of
the just culture model and benefits, I gained full support to move forward with the
implementation of just culture in the project organization. Although I was focused on one
urban medical center for the application of my project, all 8 medical center leaders who
were present agreed they would make just culture a priority for implementation in their
organization.
Foster Collaboration
I collaborated with multidisciplinary team members to oversee just culture
implementation, including chief nurse executive, patient safety, human resources,
director of education, and union representatives to ensure that guidelines are followed
with implementation of change. I provided information on the just culture model and the
project plan, and solicited discussion and feedback. I have also demonstrated
collaboration in other areas during my DNP practicum experiences.
Effective Communication
I have conducted multiple presentations on my project topic to Senior Leadership.
Presentations were also provided to senior service leaders, managers, and supervisors. I
have evaluated the effectiveness of my presentation through engaging the audience
throughout the presentation to participate and ask questions. I have received appropriate
questions and feedback that indicated the presentation objectives were met. In addition, I
have demonstrated excellent writing and critical analysis skills throughout my DNP
courses by presenting in-depth analysis of multiple topics as required for course
completion.
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Advanced Nursing Practice
I was able to apply advanced nursing practice skills through my practicum
experiences and course work assignments. I had opportunities to provide leadership in
translating knowledge into practice, lead practice inquiry, disseminate evidence from
inquiry, and analyze evidence-based practice guidelines, and assume a leadership role in
initiating my DNP project practice change. The examples below illustrate the
competencies I have gained in advanced nursing practice.
I developed just culture model interactive workshop training materials including a
facilitator guide. The training will be published as an online course for employees. In
addition, I developed a simulation learning tool with goal of providing clinicians the
ability to demonstrate critical thinking skills in early recognition of adverse events and
near miss events; learn, practice, and demonstrate appropriate and timely response to
adverse events and team work in a safe environment.
I developed an abstract of the just culture project, which was accepted and
presented at a Hospital 17th annual poster session celebrating Nursing Research. I shared
information about my project with nurses, nursing students, and other professionals who
attended the conference. I shared the tools such as the just culture algorithm, which I had
developed for this project.
Promoting Quality Improvement
Promoting ongoing quality improvement is essential in healthcare. In my
practicum and coursework, I have gained competencies such as using evidence-based
research to lead quality improvement; the impact of access, cost, and safety on quality;

80
quality improvement methods and tools; and how policy decisions impact quality. The
examples below illustrate the competencies I have gained in advanced nursing practice.
I sought opportunity to increase my skills in lean quality improvement process.
After attending yellow belt certification training, I volunteered to join an improvement
team to practice my skills. I took a leadership role in the data collection design, analysis,
and presentation, and facilitated the team progress. The project had regional impact
affecting the revenue process, eliminating waste and inaccurate billing at medical centers
across 5 states. The lead project was completed on time despite the virtual nature of this
team adding complexities with use of remote technology such as conference calls and
live meetings.
Improving Health Outcomes
I have gained competencies in applying knowledge of complex systems in
improvement; impact of healthcare system on patients and providers; organizational
structure (physical, partnerships, and resources) and impact on care delivery; and
collaboration across disciplines. Through conducting my project in just culture model
implementation, I have gained the understanding of the impact of complexity of the
healthcare system on culture change. The knowledge and skills that I gained from the
Organizational and System Leadership course afforded me the opportunity to analyze a
system issues within an organization and lead an improvement team to improve patient
outcomes through evidence-based practices. I reviewed the literature related to culture
change and discovered any change must start from leadership. In my first round of
introduction of the just culture model, I focused on educating and gaining buy-in from
leadership. I learned how information flows from top to bottom and bottom to top in this
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complex healthcare system. I was able to identify key stakeholders in leadership positions
to endorse and support the roll out of the just culture model.
Informing Healthcare Policy
I have demonstrated knowledge of the relationship between policy and practice;
how to analyze ethical, legal, and social factors in policy development; how to review
and revise policies based on current evidence; and implications of health policy
implementation. In the Health Policy and Advocacy course, I explored and evaluated the
impact of key partnerships between nursing and other professionals on nursing practice,
retention, competency, skills, and visibility. Developing nurses’ leadership skills and
competencies is essential to act as full partners in redesign and reform efforts across the
health care system. This opportunity gave me insight into how I want to practice and
present myself as a leader, through continual development of leadership competencies
and professional relationships, and taking the initiative to assert myself when appropriate.
In exploring national policies and mandates related to the just culture project, I
analyzed the PSQI Act of 2005 and evaluated its impact on patient safety and made
recommendations to strengthen the intent of this Act. I reviewed current gaps and barriers
related to the PSWP use, which guided my recommendation to enhance the use of PSWP
in order to improve patient outcomes through using reported data. My recommendations
included developing national programs to assist organizations in adapting just culture,
creating a standardized taxonomy for event reporting to compare/share data across
facilities, and to develop nurse and physician champions to improve use of this reporting
tool.
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I used the DNP essentials to guide me in conducting the above self-assessment of
the domains of leadership, Advance Nursing Practice, Promoting Quality Improvement,
Improving Health Outcomes, and Informing Health Policies. I have accomplished my
goals of each DNP essential element and plan to continue to develop and refine my
competencies as I move forward in my career. I will use opportunities such as this one to
reflect on practice and conduct a self-assessment based on the DNP essentials annually.
To continually improve my skills and grow as an effective leader, I have started
conducting 360 degree feedback surveys to obtain input from colleagues, peers, and
supervisors.
Summary
An organizational committed to safety fosters an environment of open
communication, trust, continuous improvement, and error and near miss reporting
without fear of reprisal. The project showed significant increase in the dimensions of
teamwork, communication openness, and error reporting frequency perceptions after
participation in a just culture model interactive workshop. All three of the above
dimensions are essential for adopting just culture model. This project also showed critical
areas such as nonpunitive perception of culture and management support for patient
safety that need to be further addressed in order to develop trust and shared accountability
between employees and leadership or management. These areas are key to effective
implementation of the just culture core concepts or bundle, which includes using the
algorithm to manage behaviors, speaking-up to prevent risks, reporting adverse events,
and providing an environment that supports psychological safety. Further studies are
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needed to understand the effects of the just culture on employee perception of safety and
safe practices. Future studies may provide an avenue for leadership to gain information
about staff members’ ability and willingness to recognize, recover, and report adverse
events that occur in the context of providing care. Particular to nursing, this project and
similar studies have the potential to empower nurses to create and/or revise policies and
protocols related to patient safety best practices, as well as establish a culture that
enhances the nursing profession and practice such as Magnet designation. Understanding
the effects of a just culture will lead organizational culture change conducive to increased
reporting, enhanced teamwork and communication, leader-employee partnerships,
increased accountability and trust, and organizational learning from events that occur in
the context of providing patient care. Ultimately, the goal of a just culture model is to
prevent adverse events and significantly reduce the number of deaths from preventable
medical errors each year.
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Section 5: Scholarly Product
Enhancing Nurses’ Perceptions of Patient Safety Culture
Through the Just culture Model
Abstract
Problem
Preventable medical errors cause between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths per year in
the U. S. An organization’s patient safety culture has a significant influence on the
behaviors, attitudes, and performance of leadership and employees. An organizational
culture that supports individual blame creates feelings of fear and shame to speak up and
report when errors occur and often results in an increased number of medical errors.
Studies have shown a correlation between an organization’s safety culture, including
safety sub-cultures within the organization, and risk reporting behaviors. Organizational
leaders are unable to perform system changes if risks are unknown or hidden. The just
culture model, which is a balance between nonpunitive and accountable culture, is
supported by national organizations such as World Health Organization, the American
Nurses Association, and the Institute of Medicine as a patient safety culture framework.
Purpose
The purpose of this project was to explore the influence of a just culture model
interactive workshop on employee safety culture perceptions on dimensions of overall
perception of safety, nonpunitive response to error, teamwork, communication openness,
feedback and communication, hospital management support for patient safety, and
frequency of event reporting, measured pre and postintervention. The just culture model
should be utilized to create a psychological safe environment where staff members feel
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empowered to speak up, staff members are able to recognize and prevent at risk
behaviors, and where shared accountability exists between leadership and employees.
The essential components of the just culture model are using a just culture algorithm for
error reporting and supporting a psychologically safe environment to empower
employees to speak up to prevent risks and to report adverse events and near misses. The
project had three main objectives: (1) To explore acute care unit clinical staff perceptions
of the patient safety culture at an urban medical center, pre just culture model interactive
workshop intervention (time 1) and 2 weeks postintervention (time 2); (2) To compare
the difference in the total perception scores between time 1 and time 2; (3) To explore
differences in scores for each of the selected dimensions for the project: nonpunitive
response to error, teamwork, communication openness, feedback and communication,
hospital management support for patient safety, and frequency of event reporting between
time 1 and time 2.
Evidence-Based Practice Question
The project question was: Will patient safety culture scores show significant
difference in staff members’ perceptions on safety dimensions of overall perception of
safety, nonpunitive response to error, communication openness, teamwork, feedback and
communication, frequency of event reporting, and hospital management support for
patient safety after participation in just culture model interactive workshop?
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Method
Design
The design of the project involved three stages (see Figure 4): (a) Pre-intervention
patient safety culture quantitative questionnaire, (b) Face to face interactive workshop
session, and (c) Postintervention patient safety quantitative questionnaire. A quasiexperimental one group pretest intervention posttest design was utilized to analyze cause
and effect between a just culture model interactive workshop and employee perceptions
of patient safety culture form the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Instrument
(HSPSC) questionnaire tool that was used to measure staff perceptions on safety culture
dimensions using a Likert scale, pre just culture model interactive workshop
implementation and 2 weeks postimplementation. The questionnaires were administered
anonymously with no collection of personal identifiers or demographic information. For
this project, it was not possible to utilize randomization within units and between units, as
patient safety culture change requires synergy work among all unit teams and there is
variability in unit level cultures. Confounding factors such as maturation, lack of
randomization, mortality and sample selection were identified as threats to internal
validity in utilizing a one-group pretest-intervention-posttest quasi experimental design.
Setting
The project took place in an urban medical center in the Northeast region of U. S.
The majority of the population served at this medical center was over 65 years old and no
care was provided for persons under 18 years old. Employees of the acute care units who
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provided direct clinical care were the targeted population for the project and a
convenience sample was utilized.
Data Collection
Prior to the start of the just culture model interactive workshop sessions, the
participants were provided a consent form and the HSPSC questionnaire. Project
volunteers were given 15 minutes to complete the pretest. Participants were informed
there would be a posttest questionnaire provided 2 weeks after the workshop if they
wished to continue to participate in the project. 2 weeks after the just culture model
interactive workshop, the participants were invited by e-mail using a web-based link to
complete a posttest with the same questions as the pretest questionnaire, which also
included the consent form. I entered both data sets into an Excel spreadsheet. Data were
kept secure and anonymous.
Outcomes
The t test results showed that the total patient safety culture perception pretest
mean and posttest mean differed significantly (t = 2.7, p < 0.01). Posttest overall scores
(µ=3.7) were significantly higher than pretest scores (µ=3.5). Among the safety
dimensions tested, the results showed significant increase in mean scores related to
teamwork (t = 2.99, p < 0.05), communication openness (t = 2.14, p < 0.05), and
frequency of event reporting (t = 2.31, p < 0.05) after the just culture workshop
intervention. The increase in positive responses indicated the potential influence of the
just culture model interactive workshop on changing perceptions of the participants
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related to the strength of teamwork between the unit staff, ability to speak up, and
incident reporting patterns.
The mean scores in the dimensions of overall perception of safety (t=1.0, p=3.5);
feedback and communication (t=0.62, p=0.54); nonpunitive response to error (t = 0.94, p
=0.35); and hospital management support (t=1.26, p=0.21), were not found to be
statistically significant. These findings may indicate that managers will need to provide
support, real time feedback, and communication continually about errors and role model
utilizing the just culture algorithm and error reporting in order to increase staff
perceptions of safety in all dimensions.
Conclusion
The intent of the just culture model is to guide hospital leaders and employees in
responding to errors and near misses appropriately by creating environments of trust and
psychological safety to prevent patient harm. The just culture model emphasizes errors
can by reduced or eliminated in healthcare through actions including: always anticipating
risks and errors, being a learning and proactive culture; being accountable for ones
actions; building high reliable systems; and building monitoring systems to correct
practice or policy drifts in the work place. Culture change takes time and it is not
surprising that some of the dimensions tested such as feedback and communication and
overall perception of safety scores did not show significant change in a 2-week period of
time postintervention.
The just culture model has potential for becoming the gold standard for patient
safety across the nation. Time, commitment, patience, and trust is required for an
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organization to unravel unhealthy behaviors that have become the norm and refocus
management and employees toward its mission, core beliefs, and values. Empowering
staff to embrace a just culture model requires leadership modeling, support, and
resources. It is predicted that with leadership engagement and provision workshops
focused on changing behaviors and perceptions, employees’ paradigm will begin to shift
from fear of a punitive culture toward embracing the new fair and just culture. In turn,
this change will enhance behaviors of reporting near miss and adverse events and
avoidance of at-risk behaviors. Through the just culture model workshops, staff will
begin to understand the use of the just culture algorithm as an evidence-based tool in
error investigation and response to objectively, fairly, and justly treat each incident to
ensure repeated patient safety issues do not occur. Social change toward elimination of
preventable medical errors is more likely to emerge due to changes in staff members’
accountability in applying evidence based practice and avoiding risk behaviors.
Therefore, it is recommended that further research should focus exploring the relationship
between just culture model and improvement in patient safety indicators or outcomes.
Recommended future research also includes conducting qualitative and quantitative
studies related to implementation of a just culture model and the relationship or impact on
practice change measuring variables such as use of the just culture algorithm, trends in
error reporting, staff behavioral choices, risk taking behavior, safety culture perceptions,
and speaking up. Further research is also indicated to explore barriers to just culture
implementation from the microsystem level where patient care occurs.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent
Thank you for participating in this study. Your feedback is important. Please answer the
following questions as honestly as possible.
This study involves measuring the effects of the just culture model as a patient safety
culture framework. Just culture model implementation was selected for the study topic
because it is a model that has been embraced by the Executive Leadership of the Medical
Center to be applied in redesigning the patient safety program in the near future. The
purpose of this study is to determine if introducing the just culture model to staff
members will change their perceptions of safety related to safety culture, nonpunitive
response to error, communication openness and shame, teamwork, feedback about errors,
and senior management actions in promoting patient safety. The benefit of data collected
during this study is to learn more about the effectiveness of the just culture model.
I am conducting the study as part of my Doctoral student requirements. I am currently in
the Doctor of Nursing Practice Program at Walden University. I am also newly hired in
the Risk Management/Patient Safety Program at your organization.
I do not anticipate that taking this pretest and posttest questionnaire will contain any risk
or inconvenience to you. Furthermore, your participation is strictly voluntary and you
may withdraw your participation at any time without penalty. There will be no
compensation provided for participating in this research.
This questionnaire is anonymous as there is no identifiable information collected. All
information collected will be used only for my research and will be kept confidential.
There will be no connection to you specifically in the results or in future publication of
the results. Once the study is completed, I will be happy to share the results with you if
you desire. In the meantime, if you have any questions please ask or contact: Aida
Solomon at 503-754-9777 or at aida.solomon@va.gov
Additionally, if you have any concerns about your treatment as a participant in
this study, please call or write:
Walden Research Participant Advocate
Phone number: 612-312-1210
Email: IRB@waldenu.edu
Walden University’s approval number for this study is 05-28-14-0345756 and it
expires on May 27, 2015.
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Appendix B: Research Project Questionnaire Instrument
By answering and turning in this questionnaire you are verifying that you have read the
explanation of the study, and that you agree to participate. You also understand that your
participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may keep a copy of this consent form
By answering and turning in this survey questionnaire you are verifying that you have
read the explanation of the study, and that you agree to participate. You also understand
that your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may keep a copy of this
consent form.
Questionnaire Instructions: This questionnaire was developed by the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and is designed to ask your opinions about
patient safety culture. You will be asked to complete this survey once before the just
culture Workshop begins and 2 weeks after taking the 2 hour just culture workshop. Each
survey will take 10-15 minutes to complete. Your participation is completely voluntary,
your response will be confidential and anonymous and only group results will be
reported. (That is, answers from an individual will not be reported or revealed to anyone.)
In this questionnaire, think of your “work area” as the unit, department, or area of
your facility where you spend most of your time or provide most of your services. If you
typically work in many different areas, answer the questions considering all of those
areas.
For any question, please choose the answer that most closely matches your
opinion or experience.
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following
statements.
Please indicate your level of agreement or
Statements
disagreement with the following statements by
placing an X in the appropriate box.
1=
2
3
4=
5=Strongly
Your Work Area/Unit
Strongly =Disagree =Neither Agree Agree
Disagree
Patient safety is never
sacrificed to get more work
done
Our procedures and systems
are good at preventing error
from happening.
It is just by chance that more
frequent errors do not happen
around here.
We have patient safety
problems in this unit.
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Staff feel like their mistakes
are held against them.
When an event is reported, it
feels like the person is being
written up, not the problem.
Staff worry that mistakes they
make are kept in their
personnel file.
People support one another in
this unit.
When a lot of work needs to be
done quickly, we work
together as a team to get the
work done.
In this unit, people treat each
other with respect.
When one area in this unit gets
really busy, others help out.

Communication: how often do
the following things happen in
your work area/unit
Staff will freely speak up if
they see something that may
negatively affect patient care.
Staff feel free to question the
decisions or actions of those
with more authority.
Staff are afraid to ask questions
when something does not seem
right.
We are given feedback about
changes put into place based
on event reports.
We are informed about errors
that happen in this unit.
In this unit, we discuss ways to
prevent errors from happening
again.

1= Never

2 =Rarely

3=
Someti
mes

4=
5=Always
Most
of the
time
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Your Hospital – Please
indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the
following statements about
your hospital
Hospital management provides
a work climate that promotes
patient safety..

1=
Strongly
Disagree

2
=Disagree

3
4=
5=Strongly
=Neither Agree Agree

1= Never

2= Rarely

3=
Someti
mes

Actions from top management
show that patient safety is top
priority.
Hospital management seems
interested in patient safety only
after adverse event happens.

Frequency of Events Reported
– In your hospital work
area/unit, when the following
mistakes happen, how often are
they reported?
When a mistake is made, but is
caught and corrected before
affecting the patient, how often
is this reported?
When a mistake is made, but
has no potential to harm the
patient, how often is this
reported?
When a mistake is made that
could harm the patient, but
does not, how often is this
reported?

4=
Most
of the
time

5= Always
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Appendix C: Just culture Model Workshop Presentation

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117
Curriculum Vitae
Aida Solomon, RN, MS CPHRM

EDUCATION
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Doctorate of Nursing Practice, Walden University\

2005

Masters of Science, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Oregon
Health & Science University

1996

Bachelor of Science in Nursing, Linfield College-School of
Nursing

EMPLOYEMENT
2014 – Current Risk Manager & Patient Safety, Medical Center Facility
2012- 2014

Utilization Review Nurse Facility Program Manager, Regional
Office Oversight of Multiple Medical Centers

2009- 2012

Patient Safety Officer, Multiple North West Integrated Medical
Centers

2008-2009

Risk Manager, Health Care System

2005-2009

Quality Consultant and Risk Manager, Healthcare System Center

1996- 2005

Staff Nurse & Charge Nurse, Acute Oncology/Medicine, Health
Care System

LICENSURE & CERTIFICATION
Oregon State Registered Nurse Licensure; CNS Licensure, Current
American Heart Association, Healthcare Provider Basic Cardiac Life Support
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AHA: CPHRM - Certified Professional in HealthCare Risk Management; Current
Dartmouth Improvement Advisor, Team Coach Training; 2011
Certified Trainer for Franklin Covey 7 habits of highly effective people
workshop; 2011
SPD International Association of Healthcare Central Service Material
Management; 2010
NCPS: Patient Safety Improvement & Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis;
2006
Basic & Advanced Management of Data Principles & Measurement, VA; 2006
Oncology Certified Nurse, ONCC; 2006-09; Med/Surgical Nursing, ANCC;
2003-2007
Computer training: Microsoft Office, HTML, Access; OHSU, 2004-2005
HONORS & AWARDS
North West Integrated Service Network Excellence Recognition Award 2012
OHSU Graduate Student Award: Dorothy L Johnson for innovation, creativity
insight in nursing practice, OHSU 2005
NNEI Full Scholarship Award, Graduate Education, 2003-2005
CEO Excellence in Action Award, Healthcare Center, 2002
MEMBERSHIPS
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management

